The effects of financialisation and financial development on investment: Evidence from firm-level data in Europe by Tori, Daniele & Onaran, Özlem
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The effects of financialisation and financial
development on investment: Evidence from firm-level
data in Europe
Other
How to cite:
Tori, Daniele and Onaran, O¨zlem (2017). The effects of financialisation and financial development on investment:
Evidence from firm-level data in Europe. Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre (GPERC).
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2016 University of Greenwich
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/16089/
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The effects of financialisation and financial 
development on investment: 
Evidence from firm-level data in Europe 
 
Daniele Tori and Özlem Onaran 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we estimate the effects of financialization on physical investment in 
selected western European countries using panel data based on the balance-sheets of 
publicly listed non-financial companies (NFCs) supplied by Worldscope for the period 
1995-2015. We find robust evidence of an adverse effect of both financial payments 
(interests and dividends) and financial incomes on investment in fixed assets by the 
NFCs. This finding is robust for both the pool of all Western European firms and single 
country estimations. The negative impacts of financial incomes are non-linear with 
respect to the companies’ size: financial incomes crowd-out investment in large 
companies, and have a positive effect on the investment of only small, relatively more 
credit-constrained companies. Moreover, we find that a higher degree of financial 
development is associated with a stronger negative effect of financial incomes on 
companies’ investment. This finding challenges the common wisdom on ‘finance-growth 
nexus’. Our findings support the ‘financialization thesis’ that the increasing orientation of 
the non-financial sector towards financial activities is ultimately leading to lower physical 
investment, hence to stagnant or fragile growth, as well as long term stagnation in 
productivity.  
 
Year: 2017   No: GPERC 44 
 
 
       GREENWICH POLITICAL ECONOMY RESEARCH CENTRE (GPERC) 
2 
 
Keywords: Financialization, Investment, Non-financial sector, Firm data, Europe, Financial 
development 
 
Acknowledgments: This paper has received funding from the Foundation of European 
Progressive Studies (FEPS), Think-tank for Action on Social Change (TASC), and Economic 
Council of the Labour Movement (ECLM) for the project titled “An Investment and Equality-
Led Sustainable Growth Model for Europe”. We would like to thank Engelbert 
Stockhammer, Mehmet Ugur, Jeff Powell, Maria Nikolaidi, and Gary Dymski for helpful 
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.  
 
JEL codes: C23, D22, G31 
 
Corresponding authors: 
Daniele Tori, Lecturer in Finance, The Open University Business School, and Greenwich 
Political Economy Research Centre, University of Greenwich, daniele.tori@open.ac.uk  
 
Özlem Onaran, Professor of Economics and Director of Greenwich Political Economy 
Research Centre, University of Greenwich, London SE10 9LS, o.onaran@gre.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction  
This paper estimates the effects of financialization on physical investment using panel data 
based on balance-sheets of non-financial publicly listed companies for the period of 1995-
2015 in selected European countries.  
Back in the 1950s Joan Robinson (1952:86) stated that "where enterprise leads 
finance follows", describing a financial system that was merely supporting trajectories 
already planned by the productive sector. In contrast, recent structural changes in the 
functioning of capitalism mark the growing prominence of the ‘financial motives’ over the 
traditional productive purposes. Instead of being just a vehicle for more efficient 
production plans, in the last decades the financial activities have grown disproportionately 
compared to the financing requirements of the rest of the economy. This new configuration 
raises the question of how this imbalance affected the investment processes in the non-
financial sector.  
The conventional literature asserts that financial markets facilitate the financing 
and the efficient allocation of investment (King and Levine, 1993; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Beck et al., 2000; Love, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Levine, 2005). 
However, Arestis and Demetriades (1997) warn against the robustness of these results 
based on cross-country evidence, which do not take into account the institutional 
peculiarities. Moreover, the effect of stock market development on growth is found to be 
weaker than that of the banking sector (Arestis et al., 2001). Recently after the 2007-2008 
crisis, the disproportionate growth of the financial system has been questioned in some 
conventional contributions as well (see among others Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Beck 
et al., 2014; Law and Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). In particular, Law and Singh (2014) 
and Arcand et al. (2015) argue that there is a ‘threshold effect’ in the relationship between 
the extension of financial resources and growth; thus the expansion of the financial system 
is beneficial to growth only up to a point (e.g. the ‘dimension’ of the financial system should 
not exceed 100% of the GDP). Recently, a similar argument has been put forward by an IMF 
discussion note with respect to developing and emerging markets (Sahay et al., 2015), 
which argues that the impact of financial development on growth is ‘bell-shaped’: ‘too 
much finance’ is likely to increase both economic and financial instability. Further, 
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Cournède et al. (2015) analyzed five decades of data for highly developed countries as a 
part of an OECD study. They find that, for most of the countries, the expansion of credit by 
financial intermediaries to the economy has grown three times as fast as economic activity. 
They conclude that further development of the financial system is likely to be negative for 
growth.   
In both the analysis of investment and financial development discussed above, non-
financial companies’ financial flows are not directly taken into account. Given the 
transformation of the economies towards a financialized stage in the last decades, the 
conventional models of investment may be mispecified due to their neglect of some 
important factors in the firms’ financing and investment decision.  
 The Post-Keynesian literature on ‘financialization’ illustrates the negative impacts of 
expanding financial sector on the economic systems (Epstein, 2005), on income 
distribution and demand (Onaran et al., 2010; Hein, 2013; Kohler et al., 2016), and in 
particular on investment (Stockhammer, 2004, 2006; Orhagnazi, 2008a; Dallery, 2009; 
Cordonnier and Van de Velde, 2015).  ‘Financialisation’ is a self-reinforcing socio-economic 
process, which manifests itself in the growing prominence of behaviours derived from the 
functioning of the financial sector. A similar argument can be found in the marxist 
literature, which demonstrate that the long-term trajectories of the market economies are 
gravitating more around the financial sector and less around the productive one (Foster, 
2010). Since the 1980s, the slow down in investment and growth went along with a rise in 
the interest and dividend payments and share buybacks of the non-financial corporations 
(henceforth NFCs), which ‘punctured’ the value generated by NFCs (Duménil and Levy, 
2004). Consequently, companies experienced a significant reduction in available funds for 
physical investments.1 
Despite an expanding theoretical literature on the effects of financialization, the 
empirical evidence is predominantly relegated to a macro perspective, especially in the 
case of physical investment. The origins of the theoretical microeconomic analysis of the 
impact of finance on investment can be traced back to the seminal works of Fazzari and 
                                                          
1
 Some authors of the Marxian tradition (e.g. Lapavitsas, 2009; Kliman and Williams, 2014) also argue 
for a reversed causality, i.e. financialisation of the economy should be understood as a consequence, and 
not as a cause of the slowdown in the capital accumulation. 
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Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999). To the best of our knowledge, only Orhangazi (2008b) 
and Demir (2007, 2009) analyse directly the effects of financialization on accumulation 
from a microeconomic perspective.  
This paper has three novelties: First, we provide a model of firm-level investment, 
which extends the Post-Keynesian model by Fazzari and Mott (1986) by integrating the 
effects of financial incomes as well as financial payments in a coherent fashion. Second, we 
provide the first micro-econometric evidence for a large sample of European NFCs (as well 
as single countries) on the effects of financialisation on investment using firm level balance 
sheet data from Worldscope database. This particular database allows us to build a 
consistent measure for companies’ financial activities regarding both inflows and outflows. 
Third, we explore the interactions between increasing financial development (henceforth 
FD, defined conventionally as the financial market activities) and the effect of financial 
incomes on NFCs’ investment.  
 The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the key 
theoretical and empirical contributions in the literature. Section 3 presents the alternative 
specifications of the investment functions to be estimated. Section 4 discusses the data and 
the stylized facts of our sample. Section 5 presents the estimation methodology. In section 
6 we discuss our estimation results. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Accumulation of fixed assets, liquidity, and financialisation  
In the earlier ‘accelerator investment models’ (e.g. Kuh and Meyer, 1955; Evans, 1967) the 
capital expenditure was almost entirely explained by expected profitability measured by 
sales. In contrast, the early neoclassical approach modelled the firm's investment decision 
as a static maximization problem of discounted flows of profits over an infinite time 
horizon (Jorgenson, 1963; 1971). As an alternative, investment models, based on the 
maximization of the expected cash flows (or market value) in the presence of adjustment 
costs and expectations, which take the dynamic process explicitly into account, have been 
proposed (Chirinko, 1993). Within this group, the so-called ‘Q model’ of Brainard and Tobin 
(1968), which models investment using the Tobin's Q variable, defined as the ratio of the 
firm’s stock market valuation to its capital replacement cost, has been widely used. 
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However, firm-level empirical analysis has failed to provide evidence of a strong 
explanatory power of the Q variable (Hayashi and Inoue, 1991; Bond et al., 1992). Possible 
mainstream explanations focused on the bias of the stock market evaluation due to 
asymmetric information (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) and periodic ‘financial bubbles’ (Bond 
and Cummins, 2001; Bond et al., 2004). But more importantly, as argued by Hubbard 
(1998), the source of financing matter for investment.  
Empirical evidence shows that cash-flows, i.e. internal funds, are important 
determinants of investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Blundell et al., 1992; Brown et al., 2009). 
In particular, the seminal contribution by Fazzari et al. (1988) shows that fluctuations in 
internal finance, as reflected by cash-flows, are statistically more important than the stock 
market evaluation in determining the level of accumulation. Liquidity constraints play a 
crucial role in determining investment (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993; Chirinko and Schaller, 
1995; Kadapakkam et al., 1998). In addition, the empirical evidence shows that cash flow 
always has a signficant positive effect on accumulation, whilst the effects of the stock 
market evaluation and debt are mixed (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Bond and Meghir, 
1994; Bond et al., 2003; Bloom et al., 2007).  The mainstream investment literature argues 
that companies’ financing issues mainly derive from agency problems, and the 
development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 
1990; Love, 2003; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Guariglia and 
Carpenter, 2008; Bond et al., 2003). In particular, Beck et al. (2005) find that firms with 
higher financing obstacles shows slower growth, but this relationship is weaker in 
countries with relatively more developed financial systems. In addition, these authors finds 
that FD is more effective in alleviating financing constraints especially for smaller firms. 
Nonetheless, according to their findings the effect of financial development on firms’ 
growth is always-positive. However, while some studies find a significant and positive 
effect of FD on economic growth and investment (Levine, 2005; Arestis et al., 2015), both 
the statistical significance and size of the estimates vary widely due to methodological 
heterogeneity (Valickova et al., 2015). 
In both the analysis of investment and financial development discussed above, 
companies’ financial flows are not directly taken into account. As a result of the 
transformation of the economies towards a financialized stage in the last decades, the 
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conventional models of investment may be misspecified due to their neglect of some 
important factors in the firms’ financing and investment decision. 
 The Post-Keynesian literature offers a more holistic approach to the analysis of the 
effect of financial markets on investment, where NFCs are far from passive players under 
the control of oversized financial markets. In addition to (or even partially substituting) 
physical investments, NFCs can readily accumulate financial assets. The Post-Keynesian 
literature conceives the firm as a ‘battlefield’ for different vested interests (Stockhammer, 
2006).2 The most visible type of internal conflict is reflected in shareholders’ preference for 
short-term profitability, which undermines the accumulation of fixed capital (Dallery, 
2009; Hein and van Treeck, 2008). There is a ‘growth-profit trade-off’ within the 
managerial decision-making process of firms (Lavoie, 2014). The increasing involvement of 
the NFCs in finance-related activities has to be understood primarily as a consequence of a 
change in the corporate governance (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000). From the early 1980s 
onwards, there has been a legitimization of the rule of maximizing the ‘shareholder value’ 
(Rappaport, 1999). While the former imperative has been to ‘retain and re-invest’, under 
the shareholder rule, to ‘downsize plants and distribute earnings’ is paramount. The 
management has to please the shareholder’s requests by distributing dividends and 
boosting share prices through share buyback operations (De Ridder, 2009). Furthermore, 
financialisation offers a fall back option to firms to invest in reversible short-term financial 
assets instead of irreversible long-term fixed assets, and thereby financial assets crowd out 
physical accumulation. This behavioural twist negatively affected the long-term investment 
plans. 
As already said in the introduction, the vast majority of the empirical literature on the 
impacts of financialization on investment is based on a macroeconomic framework 
(Stockhammer, 2004; van Treek, 2008; Orhangazi, 2008a; Arestis et al., 2012). Regarding 
firm level effect of finance on investment, the seminal paper by Fazzari and Mott (1986) 
models the three key components of the Post-Keynesian theory of investment: a positive 
                                                          
2
 Milberg and Winkler (2009) argue that the accumulation-financialization link is blurred by the increase 
in off-shoring. This is not a problem in our case, since all our data are provided on a consolidated basis 
(parent company plus subsidiaries). Moreover, the non-operating dividend incomes come from financial 
activities. 
8 
 
effect of sales (as a proxy for capacity utilization), a positive and independent effect of 
internal finance, i.e. ‘less expensive’ retained earnings, and a negative impact of interest 
expenses.3 In particular, they introduce a flow measure for interest payments to define a 
‘committed constraint’ on the available cash flow. In another Post-Keynesian 
microeconomic investment model, Ndikumana (1999) finds negative effects of both stock 
and flows of debt. Firm’s indebtedness not only reduces the cash flow (via interest 
payments), but also affects the sustainability  of investments.  
However, Fazzari and Mott (1986) and Ndikumana (1999) do not model the impact of 
financial revenues, which is an important dimension of financialisation. To the best of our 
knowledge, only three empirical papers explicitly analyse the financialization of the 
investment from a microeconomic perspective. 
Demir (2009) analyse financialization in the NFCs in Argentina, Mexico, and Turkey in 
the 1990s.  The author estimates accumulation as a function of a set of country specific 
control variables (risk and uncertainty measures, level of credit from the banking sector 
and the level of real GDP), and the gap between the rates of return of fixed and financial 
assets. With the latter variable, Demir captures the markets signals for future profitability 
of non-operating activities and the opportunity costs for fixed investment. With this choice, 
the expected growing profitability of financial investments (and thus an increase in 
financial income) will increasingly redirect available resources from fixed investment. 
Estimating the function using a GMM approach, the author finds that companies prefer to 
invest in ‘reversible’ short-term financial investment instead using funds for ‘irreversible’ 
long-term fixed investment plans. Increasing returns on financial assets reduces fixed 
investment spending of the industrial sector. 
Orhangazi (2008b) proposes a microeconomic version of his macroeconomic analysis 
discussed in the previous section. The author analyses the effect of financialization on the 
investment behaviour of NFCs in the US, for the period of 1973-2003. Orhangazi explicitly 
takes into account the biunivocal aspect of financialization. He uses a specification in which, 
in addition to the traditional determinants of investment (namely the lagged levels of 
investments, sales, and operating income), financial incomes, financial payments, as well as 
                                                          
3
 This study by Fazzari and Mott provides a response to the mainstream critiques of the use of liquidity 
measures to model investment by Jorgenson (1971). 
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the debt level are the other explanatory variables. Using a difference GMM estimator, he 
finds a significant and negative effect of financial payments on capital accumulation. 
Moreover, the level of long-term debt has a statistically significant and negative effect on 
investment. With respect to the financial payments, the author theorizes a ‘crowding-out’ 
effect: higher profits from the financial involvements should drive a change in the priorities 
of the management. Firms would prefer short-term reversible financial investments rather 
than long-term fixed ones. Orhangazi finds that this effect differs with respect to the 
companies’ sizes. In general, he concludes, “the nature of the relationship between financial 
markets and NFCs does not necessarily support productive investments. On the contrary, it 
might be creating impediments” (Orhangazi 2008b:883). 
Finally, the recent paper by Davis (2016) looks at financialization of NFCs in the US 
using a descriptive analysis of the changes in their balance-sheet structures. The author 
finds a) a substantial increase of the financial assets/fixed assets ratio since the 1980s; b) 
an overall increase in NFCs’ leverage; c) an increasing role of equity, and especially in the 
form of share buybacks. This increased financial orientation of US NFCs appears to be 
different with respect to firms’ size, with smaller firms again being less involved in this 
process.  
The evidence at a microeconomic level supports the thesis for which the increasing 
interconnections between the financial flows of NFCs and financial markets are likely to 
have an adverse impact on the dynamic of physical accumulation 
Event though the available evidence depict financialization as a phenomenon 
common to almost all developing and developed economies, the different institutional 
settings at country or/and regional level reveal the presence of ‘varieties of 
financialization’ (Lapavitsas and Powell, 2013). More specifically, Karwowski and 
Stockhammer (2016) studied the effect of financialization in emerging countries (Asia, 
Africa, Emerging Europe, and Latin America) according to different measures (i.e. financial 
deregulation, foreign financial inflows, asset price volatility, bank-based vs. market-based 
finance, business debt, and household indebtedness). The authors find considerable 
variation in the depth and manifestation of financialization across the various emerging 
areas. One contribution of our paper is to analyse whether financialization had similar 
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effects on NFCs’ investment in Europe to those found by previous studies in the case of the 
USA.  
Building on the reviewed literature, in the next section we describe the specifications 
of different models of investment, all of which take explicitly into account the effects of 
financialization including both financial incomes and payments. 
 
3. The theoretical model    
Within the Post-Keynesian theory, capital accumulation is an intrinsically dynamic process 
(Kalecki, 1954; Lopez and Mott, 1999). Physical investment is an irreversible phenomenon. 
There is a path dependency that link past and future levels of accumulation, as also 
confirmed by the previous empirical literature. The inclusion of the lagged level of 
investment increases the explanatory power of our models. In fact, the accumulation of 
fixed assets is an intrinsically dynamic process. As we have seen in the previous discussion, 
the past level of investment is a fundamental determinant of the actual level of 
accumulation. Thus, the process of financing the investment plan overlaps in different time-
periods, and there is a path dependency which link past and future levels of investment. 
Among others, Ford and Poret (1991)4, Kopcke and Brauman (2001), Orhangazi (2008a, 
2008b), and (Arestis et al., 2012) show the importance of the lagged accumulation in 
explaining its current value. Therefore, in all the models to be estimated, we include the 
lagged investment. Also all other explanatory variables are lagged in order to depict the 
‘adjustment processes’.  
 To analyse the potential effects of financialization, we enriched the basic version 
proposed by Fazzari and Mott (1986). Equation (1) presents our specification of 
‘financialized investment’, where the rate of accumulation, I/K, is:   
 
                                                          
4
 Ford and Poret (1991) analysed the pattern of investment in OECD countries in the 1980s from a macroeconomic 
perspective. They studied the consistency between the time-series properties of investment, output, and cost of 
capital in order to assess the empirical validity of different underlying theories. They found that for most of the 
countries the best explanatory variable for current investment dynamic is its own past trend. 
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where I is the addition to fixed assets, K is the net capital stock, S is net sales, π is net 
operating income and CD is cash dividends paid, F is the sum of cash dividends and interest 
paid on debt,    is the total non-operating (financial) income as the sum of interest and 
dividends received by the company, and Q stands for Tobin’s Q.  We use the approximate 
average measure for Tobin’s Q suggested by Chung and Pruitt (1994), who propose a 
compromise between “analytical precision and computational effort” (Chung and Pruitt, 
1994:71). This method is based on the well-established procedure proposed by Lindenberg 
and Ross (1981).5 Furthermore, i is the firm index,    identifies a set of time-dummies to 
control for unobservable time-specific effects common to all firms in the different 
estimations, whilst the standard disturbance term εit captures firm-specific fixed effects 
and idiosyncratic shocks. The operating income/fixed assets ratio is a measure of the profit 
rate, whilst the sales/fixed assets ratio is our measure of capacity utilization.6 We also 
introduce the change in total debt/total assets ratio  
  
  
   to control for the additional effect 
of indebtedness on investment. 
All variables are lagged to reflect the time consideration in the investment plans. 
The net operating income/fixed assets ratio (retained earnings) is a measure of the after 
dividends profit rate, the sales/fixed assets ratio is a proxy reflecting capacity utilization, 
financial payments/fixed assets and non-operating income/ fixed assets are the two 
measures of the impact of financialization. Table 1A in the appendices contains variables’ 
descriptions and codes. We expect positive effects of the lagged accumulation rate, profit 
                                                          
5
 See Table 1A in the Appendix for a detailed description of the variables. This measure is used also in Love and 
Zicchino (2006), who use the same database as in this paper.  
6
 I.e.  output/potential output  
 
   
  is equal to  
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
, where  
  
 
  is potential output as a ratio to capital stock, which is a 
measure of technology. With constant technology in the short time period, time effects (which we control for) 
capture the technological change. Thus, 
 
 
 is often used as a measure of capacity utilization, in particular due to a 
lack of data for  *. 
 
 
 
 
  
         
 
 
 
    
 
   
     
    
 
 
    
 
   
      
 
 
 
    
 
   
     
   
 
 
    
 
 
   
    
  
 
 
    
 
 
   
           
 
   
             
(1) 
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rate, and sales on investment. In contrast, in the light of the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic Post-Keynesian literature, we expect the impact of total financial payments 
(or ‘cash commitments’) to be negative. In this model cash dividends are conceived both as 
a reduction of available internal funds, and as reflecting behavioural changes due to the 
‘shareholder value orientation’ (henceforth SVO) as suggested by Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
(2000). The composite measure for outward financialization, F, which is the sum of interest 
and dividend payments (as a ratio to K), capturing a) the liquidity effect of interest 
payments, and b) the additional behavioural effect of the SVO. In brief, F reflects the 
financial outflows, while πF  reflects the financial inflows. Not only do NFCs use part of their 
funds to pay interest and dividend to the financial sector, but they can also more than 
before pursue non-operating financial investment themselves, thus receiving financial 
incomes. We include the sum of interests and dividends received by the NFCs (πF)  as a 
ratio to K as an additional explanatory variable7. Theoretically, the sign of the effect of 
financial incomes on investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, these incomes may have a 
positive impact on the accumulation of fixed assets by easing the liquidity constraint faced 
by firms. In particular, this can be the case for relatively smaller companies, which are 
more likely to experience liquidity restrictions compared to larger corporations. On the 
other hand, financial activities can also be detrimental to physical accumulation, since NFCs 
will be attracted by short-term, reversible financial investment, instead of engaging in long-
term, irreversible physical investment. In order to explore the potential different effect of 
financial payments in small vs. large companies, we estimate an extended version of 
specification (1) as,  
 
                                                          
7
 Interest and dividends do not exhaust the spectrum of non-operating financial incomes of NFCs. In fact, Krippner 
(2005) shows how capital gains account for a considerable part of NFCs financial profits. However, as also 
recognised by Orhangazi (2008b) with respect to Compustat database, also in Worldscope data on NFCs’ capital 
gains are not available. 
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(2) 
where the dummy variable Dn takes the value 1 if the average total assets of company i lies 
in the lower n percentile of the distribution, and takes the value 0 otherwise. In our 
estimations, this size-dummy is interacted with the financial incomes variable, as well as 
with other explanatory variables included in the above specification (the rationale of the 
dummy is the same). In this specification, while β4 is the effect of financial incomes (or 
other variables) in larger companies, β4 + β4.1  capture the effect of financial incomes (or 
other variables) in smaller companies. 
In addition, the effect of financial incomes on NFCs rate of accumulation can differ 
depending on the degree of FD of the country in which the NFCs are based.  In this paper, 
we analyse the relationship between the development of the financial system and physical 
investment by estimating the impact of NFCs financial incomes on investment at different 
levels of financial development. The financial system acts as a provider of long-term 
liquidity to finance investment but, when its size and development is detached from the 
requirements of the real-sector, a perverse effect may emerge. In fact, NFCs may take 
advantage of a growing and developing financial system to engage even more in non-
operating financial activities, causing a strong negative effect on their core capital 
accumulation. To explore this additional effect we estimate equation (3) in which we 
interact our variable for financial incomes   
  
 
  with the dummy variable    . The latter 
takes the value 1 if company i is located in a country with relatively low level of FD, and 
takes value 0 otherwise (i.e. if company i is located in a country with higher level of FD). 
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(3) 
 
In order to split our sample into countries with low and high financial development, 
we refer to the traditional index proposed by Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (1996) also used 
in Love and Zicchino (2006) among others. Even though more disaggregated indexes have 
been introduced (see Beck et al., 2010), we opted for the traditional version for two 
reasons: first, this index is more parsimonious and help us in interpreting the results. 
Second, in line with the aim of this study, we are interested in taking into account the 
‘depth’ of the financial sector. Although important, the efficiency and stability of the 
financial system used in other indexes are less relevant categories in this respect. The FD 
index is the sum of Index 1 and Findex 1 from Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996). Index 1 
summarizes the stock market development and is the sum of (standardized indices of) 
market capitalization to GDP, total value traded to GDP, and turnover (i.e. total value 
traded/market capitalization). Findex1 account for the financial intermediary development 
and is the sum of (standardized indices of) ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (i.e. M3/GDP), 
and ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP.8 If a country has a FD index above 
                                                          
8
 These indexes are computed by using a simple standardization formula. The means-removed value of variable X 
for country j is equal to    
  
          
        
 , where the term in the denominator represent the absolute average value 
across countries in the sample for the period considered. Data about the other steps of FD index computation are 
available upon request. 
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(below) the median, it will be considered to have a high-developed (low-developed) 
financial system.9  
The fourth and last specification that will be estimated is an integration of equation 
(2) and (3). The effects of financial incomes and financial payments are interacted with 
both the size-dummy and FD-dummy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
         
 
 
 
    
 
   
     
    
 
 
    
 
   
        
    
 
        
    
 
   
      
 
 
 
    
 
 
   
     
   
 
 
    
        
   
 
       
    
        
   
 
      
    
 
 
   
 
   
 
   
    
  
 
 
    
 
   
        
 
 
       
    
         
 
 
      
    
 
 
   
 
   
     
  
  
 
    
 
 
   
        
  
  
       
    
 
 
   
 
            
 
   
       
(4) 
 
For simplicity, the effect of operating income and debt are interacted with just the FD-
dummy.10 This specification allows us to estimate consistently the impact of our variables 
in different context. 
At this point of the discussion, a clarification about how to interpret the different 
effects is needed. As for the computation of the size effect in equation (2), the true effect of 
explanatory variable ‘x’ will be equal to the sum of the interacted and the non-interacted 
coefficient. The discussion is a bit more complex when more than one interaction for the 
same variable is included in the specification. Taking financial income as an example, the 
estimated coefficient β4 will correspond to the effect of this variable for companies lying in 
the top 80% of the distribution in terms of total assets, which also are in country with high 
                                                          
9
 We could have also tested a specification in which Index1 and Findex1 were inserted separately, with two 
correspondent interaction dummies. This could have helped in testing the different impact of financialization within 
the so-called ‘bank based’ vs. ‘market-based’ economic systems. However, as shown in Botta et al. (2016), this 
dichotomy is not useful when a financial system with a heavy presence of shadow-banking is taken into account. 
10
 In addition, since Total Assets already divide the debt variable, an additional interaction again based upon the 
distribution of average Total Assets would create collinearity problems in our estimation. 
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FD. The estimated coefficient β4.1 will be the effect of financial incomes in the companies in 
the top 80% of the size distribution but based in countries with low FD. Furthermore, 
coefficient β4.2 will reveal the effect of this variable in relatively smaller companies (the low 
20% of the size distribution), irrespective of their location in terms of FD. The remaining 
two effects are computed as follows. The impact of financial incomes in companies in the 
low 20% of the size distribution in countries with high FD will be equal to        . The 
result of         will be the effect of financial incomes in relatively smaller companies 
based in countries with low FD. The same logic applies to financial payments. Furthermore, 
the effect of operating income in companies based in country with low FD will be equal 
to        ; the effect of change in debt in companies based in country with low FD will be 
equal to        . When the two effect to be summed up have a different sign, the can end 
up being statistically equal to zero. To check for this we apply a Wald test to the summation 
of the effects coming from the sum of the different coefficients described above. If the p-
value of the test is higher than 10%, this means that the sum in not statistically different 
from zero. In this case, the effect of the interaction is simply zero 
With equations (1), (2), (3), and  (4) we aim at introducing full models of firm-level 
investment that are coherent with the Post-Keynesian tradition of investment analysis, and 
that a) takes into account the inherent irreversibility of physical investment, b) controls for 
the independent effect of profitability and demand, c) highlights the effects of financial 
relations, d) makes a clear distinction between operating and non-operating activities, and 
e) treats financial outflows and inflows, i.e. both outward and inward financialization, as 
fundamental determinants.11 These models aim at capturing two of the potential impacts of 
financialization. As we argued before, financial income can have both positive and negative 
effects on physical investment. Hence, the expected sign of the coefficient of financial 
income is ambiguous. This dual feature of financial non-operating income can differ 
according to the company size, as well as to the overall development of the financial system 
in which the company operates. On the contrary, we expect financial payments to have a 
negative effect, since they represent a reduction in firms’ internal funds available for 
                                                          
11
 We also extended the model with total debt/fixed capital, and change in or the square of this ratio, but we did not 
find any statistically significant effects. Results are available upon request. An extended model with share buybacks 
was not feasible due to lack of data.   
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investment due to the payments of interest on debt and dividends to shareholders. This 
variable summarizes the effect of the increase in external means of financing, as well as the 
strength of the ‘shareholder value orientation’ discussed earlier. As confirmed by theory 
and previous empirical evidence, we expect a positive and significant effects of internal 
finance and sales.  
 
4. Data and stylized facts  
Our sample consists of the following western European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK.12 We extracted our data from the Worldscope database of publicly 
listed firm’s balance sheets, which contains standardized accounting information about not 
only investment, sales, profits, interest, and dividend payments but also companies’ 
financial incomes. Standardized data on financial payments and, in particular, financial 
incomes are difficult to find; our database allows us to have a comprehensive variable for 
our analysis. Worldscope database has been acknowledged as a valuable source in the 
literature on firm-level investment analysis (e.g. Cleary 1999; Pawlina and Renneboog, 
2005; Love, 2003; Love and Zicchino, 2006). Our data are annual for the period of 1995-
2015.  
 It is well known that the presence of outliers usually characterizes firm-level data. 
To prevent biased estimations, we apply a data screening process, by excluding extreme 
outlier observations from the sample.13 First, we select firms that have at least three 
consecutive observations for the dependent variable (I/K), which is also required for 
econometric purposes (see Roodman, 2009). Second, we exclude companies with rate of 
accumulation (I/K) higher than 2.5, representing a growth rate of capital stock higher than 
250%. Third, we drop all the companies with a permanent negative mean operating income 
for the whole period. Finally, we exclude observations in the upper and lower 1% of each 
variable’s distribution. With these adjustments, we finally have data for a total number of 
25726 observations and 2881 publicly listed non-financial companies in Western Europe. 
                                                          
12
 Given restricted data availability for the NFCs in Luxembourg, we decided to exclude this country from the 
analysis. 
13
 Guariglia and Carpenter (2008), Love and Zichino (2006), Chirinko et al. (1999) and Orhangazi 
(2008b) follow similar strategies to define and exclude the outliers. 
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Table 1A in the appendix summarize the definitions and codes of the variables employed. 
Furthermore, Tables 2A to 6A in the appendix show more specific descriptive statistics and 
coverage of our sample. Next, we present the stylized facts of our sample for Europe, and 
for the single selected countries.  
 Figure 1 shows the trends in the additions to fixed assets as a ratio to 
operating income in both the European aggregate as a whole and selected economies. A 
common feature of the last twenty years has been a reduction in the reinvestment of profit 
of NFCs in the majority of the countries between 1995 and 2015. Overall, the slowdown in 
investment has been remarkable in Europe, with a 32% decline in the re-investment rate 
on average, where NFCs are investing about 33% of their profits as of 2015; this ratio was 
50% in 1995.  The highest fall is in Sweden (-49%), the UK (-32%), and Italy (-28%).   
 
<Figure1 here> 
<Figure 2 here> 
One common finding in the financialization literature is that NFCs have been 
engaging in non-operating activities, i.e. accumulating financial assets, to an increasing 
extent. As can be seen in Figure 2, in general the ratio of financial assets to fixed assets 
clearly increased albeit with some differences: on average in Europe, the ratio increased by 
93%; as of 2015 NFCs financial assets are 3.3 times their fixed assets in Europe. The UK and 
Germany experienced the strongest rise in this ratio (423%, 324%, and 285% 
respectively). To summarize, this preliminary descriptive analysis suggest that, in general, 
NFCs diverted funds from real investment towards the accumulation of non-operating 
financial assets. 
 In figure 3, changes in the rate of reinvestment is plotted against the accumulation 
of financial assets from 1995 to 2008 all 14 countries14. There is considerable 
heterogeneity among countries. On the one hand, despite growing financial assets, in some 
countries the NFCs’ rate of reinvestment did not decline significantly (Belgium, Austria, 
                                                          
14
 We exclude the years after the Great recession such that our analysis is not biased by the extreme 
changes after the crisis. 
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Greece, and Spain). On the other hand, NFCs in countries like France, Finland, Germany, the 
UK, Ireland, and especially Sweden, experience a clearer negative relationship between 
these two measures. The inverted U-shaped fitted line in Figure 3 indicates that the 
negative relationship between NFCs’ investment and financialization (here merely 
conceived as accumulation of financial assets) could be non-linear. 
 
<Figure 3 here> 
 
 
Focusing on the aggregate European sample, Figure 4 shows that during 1995-2015 
the NFCs’ rate of accumulation (I/K) has been stagnant around an average value of 24%. At 
the same time, NFCs’ financial payments (dividends plus interests as a ratio to fixed assets) 
have been increasing significantly. There is also a sharp increase in the level of non-
operating incomes (as a ratio to fixed assets) before the crisis (173%). The 2007-8 crisis 
has led to a reversal in the NFCs’ financial incomes, although they are slowly recovering 
towards the levels of the early 2000s. Figures 5 to 18 show the relationship between the 
rate of accumulation of physical capital and our two measures of financialization - financial 
payments and incomes as a ratio to total assets - to analyse the double-sided impact of 
financialization.   
 
<Figure 4 here> 
 
In the UK (figure 5), the rate of accumulation has remained stagnant around an 
average of 25% for the whole period, and the reinvested profits declined. In sharp contrast, 
the stock of financial assets increased substantially, reaching 3.6 times higher than fixed 
assets in 2015. This substantial involvement in the accumulation of financial assets 
resulted in increasing non-operating income for the NFCs until the 2007-2008 crisis. 
Financial payments of the NFCs in the form of interests on debt and dividends paid to the 
shareholders also increased substantially since the mid-1990s, partially recovering from a 
decline during the crisis period.   
 In France (figure 6) the rate of accumulation of NFCs remained stagnant around 
31%. In contrast, in the last twenty years financial payments increased substantially, 
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reaching 33% of fixed assets. Also financial incomes increase, peaking in 2008 when they 
reached 4% as a ratio to fixed assets. After the crisis, these incomes stabilized around the 
levels of the mid-1990s. 
 
< Figures 5 to 10 here > 
 
In Germany, NFCs experience decreasing rate of accumulation, which dropped by 
50% in the period considered (figure 7).  At the same time, financial payments increased by 
almost 80%, without being seriously affected by the crisis. As the NFCs in the UK and 
France, also in Germany corporations have seen their financial incomes increasing before 
the crisis, here peaking in 2007 at a value of 8% as a ratio to fixed assets.  
NFCs in Italy also experience a declining rate of accumulation (by 30%), along with 
an increase in financial payments, although the trend in the latter is relatively modest in 
comparison to other countries (figure 8). Financial incomes reached the highest value in 
2002 (3.3% of fixed assets) and after that stabilized around 2%, without being much 
affected by the crisis. 
In Spain, NFCs’ rate of accumulation stagnated around 0.18, slightly declining in the 
last twenty years (-7%). Financial payments increased particularly in the mid-2000s and, 
almost unaffected by the economic downturn, they stabilized at a value of 40% as a ratio to 
fixed assets (figure 9). Financial incomes had a volatile trend, increasing by 19% in the full 
period. 
Swedish NFCs appear to be the most severely involved in the process of 
financialization (figure 10). Along with a stagnant average rate of accumulation of 29% 
(and a decreasing rate of re-investment), accumulated financial assets are more than 5 
times the fixed assets in its peak. Also financial payments increased substantially and, after 
a decrease in 2008, fully recovered stabilizing around a value of 100% as a ratio to fixed 
assets. Financial incomes have a trend similar to the one of financial payments, although 
after the 2007-8 crisis the former normalized around 7% as a ratio to fixed assets. 
Nonetheless, this represents one of the highest value across the European economies. 
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In the Netherlands (figure 11), the rate of accumulation of NFCs on average declined 
from 25% in 1995 to 16% in 2015. In the same period, the ratio of financial payments to 
fixed assets increased substantially, reaching the maximum value in 2013 (0.59). Financial 
incomes more than doubled, peaking in 2008, before going back to values closer to the ones 
in the early 1990s after the 2008 crisis.  
In Ireland (figure 12), the rate of accumulation of the NFCs has been overall 
stagnant, declining to 16% in 2013 and recovering slightly during 2014-15. The ratio of 
financial payments to total fixed assets increased considerably reaching 45% in 2015, 
whilst financial payments have been characterized by a volatile cycle in the first half of the 
period and stabilized at lower values after the crisis.  
Also in Finland NFCs experience a stagnant rate of accumulation around an average 
value of 27% (figure 13). In the meantime, financial payments increased substantially from 
16% to 80% of the fixed assets in the period considered. Financial incomes decreased from 
1995 to the 2008 crisis and started to recover after 2010 reaching 4% of fixed assets.  
In Greece (figure 14), NFCs show the most peculiar trends with respect to the three 
variables analyzed. From 1995 to 2013 the rate of accumulation declined from 21% to 7%, 
(albeit recovering in the last three years). Financial payments declined from 31% to 21% of 
fixed assets. Financial incomes show a declining trend as well from a very high value as a 
ratio to fixed assets, namely 12%, to 3.5% in 2013 (with a partial recovery in the last two 
years). 
 
 < Figures 11 to 18 here > 
 
 
In Denmark (figure 15), the average rate of accumulation of NFCs has been around 
22% during 1995-2015. Financial payments show a steep increase before the 2008 crisis, 
and after a downturn, a full recovery to pre-crisis values (44%). Financial incomes appear 
to be very volatile, have been decreasing before the crisis, and have started to recover since 
2012.  
In Portugal (figure 16), NFCs’ rate of accumulation remained stagnant around a low 
average value of 15%. In contrast to this, the two financialization variables shows, on 
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average, a clear increasing trend: in the period considered, financial payments increased 
from 13% to 30% of fixed assets, whilst financial incomes reached 6% of fixed assets in 
2013. 
NFCs in Belgium show a decreasing rate of accumulation from 21.4% to 12.5%. Both 
financial payments and financial incomes appear to have been very volatile in the period 
considered, with the former showing very high values (only partially comparable to what 
was described for Sweden, see figure 10). Financial incomes increased substantially before 
the crisis and then stabilized around 3% of fixed assets. 
Also in Austria NFCs had very volatile trends in both financial payments and 
incomes. On average, financial payments increased from 13% to 50%, whilst financial 
incomes remained around a value of 1.7% of fixed assets. In parallel with the other 
countries, the rate of accumulation shows a flat trend around 22%.   
 
The last part of this section presents the degree of financial development (FD), 
based on a widely used index computed for the 14 countries analyzed. The FD index is a 
combination of standardized measures of five components, namely market capitalization as 
a ratio to GDP, total value traded as a ratio to GDP, total value traded as a ratio to market 
capitalization, ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, and credit to the private sector as a ratio to 
GDP.15 The source of these variables is the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 
of the World Bank. We split the European countries into two groups, to which we refer as 
countries with ‘high’ and ‘low’ FD, according to their median FD value from 1995 to 2007, 
excluding the years after the financial crisis. Figure 19 below shows the values of FD index 
for the countries included in our analysis.16  
The countries with relative highly developed financial systems are the UK, Spain, 
Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and France; countries with relatively low levels of 
financial development are Ireland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Austria, and Greece.17 
                                                          
15
 One of the limitations of this index is that it does not take into account NFCs’ corporate bonds issuance. 
16
 Tables 5A and 6A in the appendix provide additional information about this measure and values by 
year. 
17
 It has to be noted that the classification described above is relative, and conditional on both the 
standardization process and the average level of FD computed among the countries included in the 
sample.  
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<Figure 19 here> 
 
 
To summarize, the stylized facts hint at a)  stagnant or declining rates of 
accumulation, b) declining rates of reinvestment of profits, c) an increase in the overall 
degree of financialization in terms of financial assets, financial incomes as well as financial 
payments both in the European aggregate as well as in the majority of the economies, d) 
the presence of non-linearity with respect to the relationship between the level of 
financialization and investment and e) some heterogeneity among countries. These stylized 
facts suggest an overall negative relationship between the rate of accumulation and the 
non-operating financial activities of NFCs, which will be investigated further via 
econometric estimations.  
 
5. Estimation methodology  
The four specifications presented in Section 3 are estimated using a dynamic panel-data 
model including the lag of the accumulation rate as explanatory variables. As explained in 
section 3, we treat investment as an intrinsically dynamic phenomenon.  
In dynamic panel data models, the unobserved panel-level effects are correlated 
with the lagged dependent variables. Therefore, standard estimators (e.g. Ordinary or 
Generalized Least Squares) would be inconsistent. Therefore, we estimate our models 
using a difference-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This methodology is suitable 
for analyses based on a ‘small time/large observations’ sample.i GMM is a powerful 
estimator for analyses based on firm-level data mainly for three reasons (Roodman, 2009). 
First, GMM is one of the best techniques to control for all sources of endogeneity between 
the dependent and explanatory variables, by using internal instruments, namely the lagged 
levels of the explanatory variables, which allows us to address dual causality, if rising 
financial payments and incomes is also a consequence of the slowdown in the capital 
accumulation. The instrument set consists of instruments that are not correlated with the 
first difference of the error term, but correlated with the variable we are estimating. 
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Second, by first-differencing variables, this estimator eliminates companies’ unobservable 
fixed effects. Third, GMM can address autocorrelation problems.  
The final estimates come from the combination of instruments and a vector of 
parameters that shows the minimum correlation between the error term and the 
instruments. We perform three types of tests on the estimation results. Firstly, we apply 
the Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation (Arellano and Bond, 1991) 
which tests for the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals.  Secondly, we verify the 
validity of the instruments set through the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) which takes the 
orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of 
consistency between estimated and sample moments.18 Thirdly, we incorporate time 
effects to account for shocks that are common to all firms in a specific year, and test the 
joint significance of the time dummies by using a Wald test. 
We apply two tests to assess the appropriateness of the instrument sets, and lag 
structures. First, we check for second-order serial correlation with the Arellano-Bond test 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Second, we verify the validity of the instruments sets through 
the Hansen test.19 In all models, the lagged dependent variable enters the instrument set as 
endogenous while all other explanatory variables enter as predetermined regressors. 
Consistently, the instrument sets include the second and third lags of the lagged dependent 
variable, and the first and second lags of the other lagged explanatory variables.  We test 
the joint significance of the time dummies, and the consistency of the interaction dummies 
on financial incomes using a Wald test. 
                                                          
18
 As argued by Roodman (2009), Hansen’s-J test is preferred to the usual Sargan test when we allow for the 
presence of heteroscedasticity in the error terms (i.e. errors are non-spherical). The Sargan test is a special case of 
Hansen test when we assume homoscedastic errors. However, the Hansen test (similar to the Sargan test) is sensitive 
to the total number of instruments. To control for this effect, we will check also the validity of the “difference-in-
Hansen test” which control for the validity of the instruments set excluding groups. In addition, we performed 
robustness checks by reducing (collapsing) the number of total instruments. Overall, we defined models with the 
ratio between instruments and observations not exceeding 10 per cent.  
19
 Hansen test takes the orthogonality between instruments and regressions’ residuals as the indicator of consistency 
between estimated and sample moments. We tested and confirmed the presence of heteroscedasticity in our sample 
by using the White/Koenker and the Breusch-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook-Weisberg tests. Hansen’s-J test is preferred to 
the Sargan test in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Roodman, 2009). However, the Hansen test (as the Sargan test) 
is sensitive to the total number of instruments. Therefore, we use only the first and second lags of our variables as 
instruments. Furthermore, all instruments are ‘collapsed’, thus having an instrument for each variable and lag 
distance. 
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All the variables are in logarithmic form to allow for non-linear relationships 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. Furthermore, the logarithmic scale 
enables us to reduce the disturbances coming from the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
Robust standard errors are calculated through a two-step procedure after a finite-sample 
correction (Windmeijer, 2005).  
All the estimations come from weighted regression, with the weights equal to 1 over 
the available observations for a specific country. This procedure mitigates the bias in the 
results coming from the highest data availability for core countries. Finally, we applied a 
general-to-specific estimation procedure, thus dropping from the specification the 
explanatory variable with the highest level of statistical insignificance at each step until we 
arrive at a specification with only significant variables. By doing this we get to the most 
parsimonious lag structures for different specifications. 
 
6. Estimation results  
This section presents our estimation results based on the four equations discussed in 
Section 3.  We perform a dynamic panel-data analysis using firm-level balance sheet data 
from the Worldscope database supplied by Thomson Reuters. Using the Generalized 
Methods of Moments, we test the relative importance of traditional explanatory variables 
such as operating income, sales, and stock market evaluation in determining the 
investment rate. In addition, we propose an extended model of investment taking into 
account companies’ non-operating activities, namely financial incomes and payments to the 
financial markets, as well as quantifying the impact of financial development.  
First, we discuss our basic findings both at the aggregate and at country level. Second, we 
focus on our findings when the degree of financial development is included as a 
macroeconomic ‘control’ variable. Third, we present the economic significance of the 
effects of financialization on investment in each country. Finally, we provide a brief 
comparison with the available evidence in the literature. 
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 The effect of financialization on investment in Europe 
Table 1 presents the estimation results for the aggregate pool of all the 14 European 
countries based on equation (1). As can be seen in column 1, the lagged level of 
accumulation, sales, and net operating profit have positive effects on investment, as 
expected. Aggregated financial payments (dividends and interest) have a significant and 
negative effect on the rate of accumulation. The impact of non-operating financial incomes 
(πF/K) on investment is also negative and significant. The change in the level of 
indebtedness has an additional negative effect on investment. These results are robust to 
the inclusion of Tobin’s Q as an additional control variable, which has the expected positive 
sign. The results indicate that financialization has negatively affected NFCs’ capital 
accumulation in Europe. The results are consistent with previous research showing that 
there is a negative impact of financialization on investment in both the US and developing 
countries (e.g. Orhangazi, 2008b; Demir, 2007, 2009). Column 2 presents the results for the 
same specification, but for the sample until the 2007 crisis, as a further check.  Overall, the 
results are robust, with an increase in the negative effect of financial payments (F/K). 
However, the variable measuring internal funds (π-CD) is now insignificant.  
As already discussed, theoretically the sign of the effect of non-operating income on 
physical accumulation is ambiguous. On the one hand, relatively smaller companies may 
use this additional source of income to partially ease liquidity constraints. On the other 
hand, the larger and more flexible non-financial companies may see short-term and 
reversible financial investment as an attractive alternative to physical investment. This 
choice may then come at the expense of long-term physical investment, and thus has an 
adverse effect on the rate of accumulation of these large corporations. We explored this 
possible dual, non-linear effect, by including an interaction dummy variable to account for 
the potentially different effect of financial incomes with respect to the size of the company 
(in terms of total assets). In these alternative specifications as described in Equation (2) in 
Section 3.3, the coefficient associated with the variable πF/K show the effect of companies 
in the different top percentiles of the distribution. To compute the elasticity for the 
remaining companies we sum the coefficient for (πF/K)*Dn with the coefficient for πF/K, 
and then check for statistical significance of the new measure with a Wald test.  
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<Table 1 here> 
 
The evidence suggests that negative impacts of financial incomes are non-linear 
with respect to the companies’ size. In Column 3 of Table 1, we present the results for the 
specification including of a dummy that is 0 if the company lies in the top 80% and 1 if it is 
in the lowest 20% of the distribution in terms of total assets. There is a statistically 
significant difference between the large and small companies with respect to the impact of 
financial incomes. In particular, top 80% of the companies in terms of size experience a 
strong negative effect of financial incomes (-0.12), while the firms in the lowest 20% of the 
sample, the effect is positive (0.16). On the contrary, the negative effect of financial 
payments is stronger in relatively smaller firms (-0.19 vs. -0.05). Financial incomes crowd-
out physical investment for the top 80% of the companies whilst smaller companies’ 
investments suffer more from financial payments. Given these results, we can conclude that 
financial incomes are negatively affecting NFCs’ rate of accumulation in Europe, although 
there is a positive effect for relatively smaller companies.   
In Table 1a, we present the estimation results based on equation (1) for selected 
countries, for which the number of firms is large enough to apply our estimation 
methodology.20  We kept the specification including Tobin’s Q whenever it was significant. 
As expected there is a positive effect of lagged rate of accumulation, sales and retained 
earnings (although the latter effect is not statistically robust for each country). 
 
<Table 1a and 1b here>  
 
                                                          
20
 The choice of the selected countries has been informed by data availability. In fact, the dynamic GMM 
estimator suffer from small sample bias, thus requires a substantial number of cross sections, and 
estimation based on relatively low number of observations (or groups) do not satisfy the conditions for 
these estimators to be applicable, which makes country specific estimations for small countries only 
indicative. In Table 3a we provide information about the percentage of total companies in the low 20% 
and top 30% of the total assets distribution by country (see columns e and f ). Even though smaller 
companies are underrepresented, the share of companies in these two groups is similar across countries 
(with the partial exception of Spain where the difference in the share of NFCs in the low 20% and in the 
top 30% is around 22%). 
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The negative crowding-out effect of financial incomes is a robust significant finding 
in all countries. Even though a straight comparison between estimates maybe statistically 
distorted, we find the strongest negative effect of non-operating income in the NFCs in 
Sweden and France (-0.17 and -0.13 respectively). Our other financialization variable, i.e. 
financial payments have a negative effect on NFCs’ investment in all countries apart from 
Italy and Sweden, where we did not find a significant effect.  Overall, these single country 
estimations confirm our previous findings of a negative impact of both financial incomes 
and payments on NFCs’ rate of accumulation based on the pool of all western European 
firms. In addition, at the aggregate level the negative effect of financial incomes is common 
to countries with different levels of FD.21  
Table 1b presents the results for estimations based on equation (1) for countries 
with a small number of publicly listed companies. Given the small number of firms, we 
report these results as indicative.  As before, the effect of profitability on NFCs investment 
is not robust across countries. In contrast, sales has a consistent, positive effect on 
accumulation, which is also significant in most cases. The effect of financial incomes on 
investment is negative and significant for Austria, Ireland, and the Netherlands. In 
particular, Austria and Ireland have the highest negative elasticities. With respect to 
financial payments, the estimated effect is overall negative, with the exception of Austria, 
Belgium, and Greece. The strongest negative effect of financial payments is in Ireland and 
Portugal. 
 
Financial development and financialized investment in Europe 
Table 2 presents the results based on equations (3) and (4)22. With these estimations, we 
aim at the effect of the development of the financial system on European NFCs’ physical 
investment. As we have seen before, the conventional argument within this literature is 
                                                          
21
 For a deeper analysis of the effect of financialization on the UK NFCs’ investment, see Tori and 
Onaran (2015). For additional evidence for the US and emerging economies, see Tori and Onaran (2016). 
22
 Weighted regression (w=1/total country obs.). I and II specifications based on Equation (3), III and IV 
specifications based on Equation (4), two-step difference-GMM estimations. Coefficients for the year 
dummies are not reported. Robust corrected standard error in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant ant 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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that FD has a general positive effect on economic growth. In particular, the conventional 
arguments suggests that FD is good for companies’ investment given an enhanced 
allocation of resources (Levine, 2005) and reduced cash-flow constraints (Love and 
Zicchino, 2006). However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the available literature 
takes into account the novel features of NFCs’ investment behaviour, i.e. the impacts of 
their growing non-operational financial activities.  
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results for specification (3) for the European pool. 
Here we interacted NFCs’ financial incomes (πF/K) with a dummy that takes value 1 if 
company i is based in a country characterized by a low FD index, and zero otherwise. In 
order to better characterize our specification, we interacted also retained earnings, 
financial payments, and change in total debt with the same dummy, and the interpretation 
is the same.  
Similar to the results presented in Table 1, the positive effects of the lagged rate of 
accumulation, sales, and retained earnings are confirmed. In addition, we find that the 
effect of retained earnings is significantly stronger in companies operating in an 
environment with relatively low financial development (0.59 vs. 0.04). This confirms the 
previous findings on the positive effect of FD in easing NFCs’ financing constraint (see 
especially Love, 2003 and Love and Zicchino, 2006).  
 
<Table 2 here> 
 
With respect to the effect of financial incomes, we find that for companies based in 
countries with high FD the effect is highly negative (-0.27).  On the contrary, a lower degree 
of FD is associated with a positive, yet small, effect of financial incomes on investment 
(0.08). 
In addition, the negative effect of financial payments on NFCs’ accumulation is more 
than triple in less financially developed, i.e. more financially constrained, countries (-0.22 
vs. -0.07). In addition, companies in countries with lower FD experienced a stronger 
negative effect of indebtedness (-0.09 vs. -0.02). 
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Column 2 of Table 2 shows the results for the same estimation for the period of 
1995-2007. Even though the sign of the various effects is the same, the positive effect of 
financial incomes for companies in countries with low FD is higher with respect to the full 
period (0.12 vs. 0.04). In addition, in the period prior to the crisis, the increase in total debt 
had a small positive effect on the investment of these companies (0.03). 
Column 3 of Table 2 presents the results obtained by estimating equation (4). In this 
case, we introduce both the size-dummies and FD-dummies, to test for the differences in 
the impact of financial incomes with respect to size of the companies in the context of 
different levels of FD. The signs of the lagged dependent variable and sales are consistent 
with what was discussed before. Operating income had a small positive effect for 
companies in countries with high FD, whilst its effect is larger for companies in countries 
with low FD.  
This can be seen a further confirmation of the highest financial constraint 
experienced by companies based in an environment with less developed provisions of 
financial services. Interestingly, when disaggregating by size and level of FD at the same 
time a) the effect of financial incomes on investment is negative in both large and small 
companies in countries with high FD, and b) the effect is positive for both small and large 
companies in countries with low FD; however, the size of the positive effect for large 
companies is close to zero.  
With respect to financial payments, the estimated effect on investment is significant 
and negative only for large companies, both in countries with low or high levels of FD. In 
the small companies in both country groups the effect is statistically insignificant; i.e. small 
companies seem not to suffer from the SVO and from the potential negative impact of the 
cost of capital. 
As before, Column 4 of Table 2 presents the results for the estimation of the same 
specification for the pre-crisis period. The effect of financial incomes for large companies in 
countries with low FD now turns statistically insignificant. This effect is still positive and 
significant for small companies in countries with low FD. The insignificant effect of 
financial payments on smaller companies is confirmed also for the period before the 2007 
crisis. Furthermore, given the p-value of the Wald test (0.329), in this period the effect of 
debt for companies in countries with low FD is insignificant. 
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Economic effects of financialization in Europe 
This section is analyses the economic significance of our estimates. We first compute the 
long-run elasticities by dividing each short-run elasticity by one minus the coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run elasticity by the actual cumulative 
change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic 
effect. We computed the economic effects based on elasticities estimated for the period 
1995-2007, thus excluding the impact of the financial crisis, after which financial activities 
have been severely affected. 
First, we discuss the economic effects based on the estimation results of the basic 
specification (1) in Table 1. Second, the economic effects based on specification (4) in Table 2 
are presented, which highlight the different patterns arising when we account for the 
differences in the size of the company and the financial development of the country.  
Sales (capacity utilization) have been the main determinant of accumulation in all 
countries with high FD, with an average economic effect of 0.26. Given a higher long run 
coefficient of operating income for countries with low FD (0.37), internal funds have been 
the main determinant in this group. 
The average economic effect of operating income is 0.348 (excluding Greece for 
which long run coefficient is positive but the actual cumulative change has been negative). 
The comparison of the economic effects of sales and operating income in countries 
with different levels of FD shows that NFCs’ investment are relatively more demand-
constrained when FD is high, while relatively more liquidity-constrained in countries with 
lower level of FD.  
At the country level, the crowding-out effects of financial incomes on investment 
(inward financialization) is confirmed for NFCs in countries with high level of FD. With a 
long run elasticity of -0.37, and an average cumulative change of 1.04 in the period 
considered, the average economic effect has been equal to -0.38. Sweden and the UK 
experienced the highest negative effects (-0.71 and -0.50, respectively), whilst NFCs’ 
investment in Spain and France suffered relatively less from crowding-out (-0.26 and -0.16, 
respectively). 
While we find that financial incomes provide some additional funds for NFCs in 
countries with relatively low FD, the economic effect has been rather small in most of the 
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countries. This is mainly due to an average cumulative change of 0.34, which is three times 
lower than the changes in countries with high FD. The average positive economic effect has 
been equal to 0.07.  
The adverse economic effect of financial payments (outward financialization) is the 
same in both countries with high and low FD. However, the NFCs in countries with lower 
level of FD experienced the strongest negative effect of financial payments (interests plus 
dividends), with an average effect of -0.18. This effect has been lower in general in 
countries with high FD, (-0.17), while again Sweden and UK are the most negatively 
affected countries (-0.24 and -0.13 respectively).  
 
<Table 3 here> 
 
The effect of the change in indebtedness on investment has been zero in countries 
with low FD (due to an insignificant estimated elasticity). Also in NFCs in countries with 
high level of FD, this effect is not large, though negative in the majority of the countries (the 
exceptions are Finland and Sweden).  
 Table 4 presents the computation of long run elasticities and economic effects based 
on Table 2 specification 4. Here the economic impacts of our two measures of 
financialization (and indebtedness) are accounts for the differences in the companies’ sizes 
and levels of financial development of the country.  
Again sales are the main determinant of NFCs investment in countries with high 
level of FD (except Belgium), whilst operating income played a less important role. 
Different from the previous model, in countries with lower FD the demand and the internal 
finance measures had a similar importance for NFCs’ investment. Notwithstanding this, the 
stronger liquidity constraint experienced by companies in countries with relatively lower 
FD is confirmed also by this estimation.  
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We find that the negative economic effect of financial payments has been 
particularly strong for NFCs in counties with high level of FD. Moreover, there is no positive 
effect of financial incomes on small NFCs’ investment.  
 
<Table 4 here> 
 
Interestingly, we find that, in countries with high level of FD the crowding-out impact of 
financial revenues on investment has been effective for both large and small companies. 
Even though the negative long run elasticities are higher for large companies (-0.36 vs. -
0.20), on average, the negative effect in small companies has been similar to the effect in 
large ones (-0.33 vs. -0.31). This is due to the very high increases in small companies’ 
financial incomes. The highest negative effects in large companies has been experienced in 
Sweden and the UK (-0.47 and -0.41, respectively). In countries with a low level of FD, the 
effect of financial incomes on large companies’ investment is insignificant. However, small 
companies’ investment benefited from increasing financial incomes, with Ireland and 
Belgium at the top. In Austria and Portugal, given an actual reduction in financial incomes, 
the economic effect of non-operating incomes has been negative for the small companies as 
well. 
Overall, in Europe the rate of investment by the NFCs would have been 27% higher 
without the rise in interest and dividend payments in 2007 compared to 1995, and 10% 
higher without the crowding-out effect of increasing financial incomes (see Table 3). 
Looking at some country cases, in the UK, in large NFCs, investment rate would have been 
16% higher without the rise in financial payments, and 41% higher without the increasing 
financial incomes, and in the small NFCs, investment would have been 35% higher without 
the rise in financial incomes. In Ireland, in large NFCs, investment rate would have been 
14% higher without the rise in financial payments, however on a positive note, in the small 
NFCs, investment rate has been 222% higher due to the rise in financial incomes.  Similarly, 
in Denmark, in large NFCs, investment rate would have been 33% higher without the rise 
in financial payments, however on a positive note, in the small NFCs, investment rate has 
been 196% higher due to the rise in financial incomes.  
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To summarize, overall, financialization had a negative impact on NFCs’ 
accumulation in Europe. Whilst the effect of financial payments has been similarly negative 
for almost all the countries analysed, the impacts of financial incomes are more varied. In 
fact, in countries in which financial markets and intermediaries are highly developed, the 
increasing NFCs engagements in financial investment had an adverse effect on their 
accumulation of fixed capital.  
As previously discussed, the microeconomic evidence about the effects of 
financialization on investment is limited to few contributions. In what follows we try to 
compare our findings with the existing evidence.  
Using a different measure for financial incomes, we find an overall negative effect of 
financialization on the investment of the European NFCs similar to that found by Orhangazi 
(2008b) for the USA.  The positive effect of financial incomes on accumulation of the small 
companies found in the case of the USA is confirmed only in part. In fact, as we have seen, 
when including the level of financial development as an additional macroeconomic control 
variable, the effect of these non-operating incomes is negative also for the relatively small 
companies in countries with highly developed financial systems. 
The results from the estimation with the inclusion of financial development as a 
variable to capture different levels of financialization are, to the best of our knowledge, one 
of the novelties of this paper. In terms of comparison with previous studies, we can 
compare our evidence with the broad conventional literature about finance and investment 
(in particular King and Levine, 1993; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Beck et al., 2000; 
Love, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Levine, 2005; Love and Zicchino 2006). Even though 
our results indicate that a more developed financial system is easing NFCs’ financial 
constraints (based on the estimated impact of operating income), the inclusion of as the 
impact of ‘financialization’ allowed us to uncover another effect that is not discussed in the 
conventional literature: in fact, a more developed financial system is at the same time 
enabling NFCs to engage with financial activities (thus receiving financial incomes), which 
are crowding-out their core business, namely the accumulation of physical assets. 
Although not fully comparable, our results confirm previous findings at the 
microeconomic level for the USA (Orhangazi, 2008b; Davis, 2016), as well as at the 
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macroeconomic level for the USA and European countries (see in particular Stockhammer, 
2004; van Treeck, 2008). 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper provides a novel framework of modeling the impact of financial activities, in 
particular of inward and outward financialization, on investment, and presents new micro-
econometric evidence on the effects of financialization on firm-level investment in Europe, 
using data of publicly listed NFCs. In particular, we focused on three aspects. Firstly, even 
though higher gains from financial investment can relax NFCs’ cash-flow constraint, they 
can adversely affect investment by crowding-out physical investments. Secondly, 
increasing financial payments for external finance and favouring the shareholders (i.e. 
rising interest and dividend payments) may reduce the NFCs funds, and thus investment. 
Thirdly, even though financial development (the growth of stock markets and financial 
intermediaries) may allow efficient allocation of investment resources, it can also push 
NFCs’ management to ‘financialize’ their companies’ strategy, and suppress investment in 
fixed assets.  
 Our findings for Europe provide at least two key insights on the relationship 
between financialization and NFCs’ accumulation. First, at the aggregate level, we show 
that financialization, depicted as the increasing orientation towards external financing, 
shareholder value orientation and the internal substitution of fixed investment by financial 
activity, had a fundamental role in suppressing investment in the NFCs. The lower 
availability of internal funds constrains the investment decision. On the one hand, the 
increase in financial payments (both interest and dividend payments) have a negative 
effect on investment. On the other hand, the negative crowding-out effects of financial 
activities on investment more than offset the gains from relaxing the cash-flow constraint. 
Financial incomes have a positive effect on investment only for the small companies, but a 
significant negative effect in the large companies. It has to be noted that larger companies 
create the vast majority of capital, and the crowding-out of physical investment of these 
companies by financial activity is a substantial drag on the investment performance and 
productivity of the European countries.  
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Second, financial development has an overall negative effect on NFCs’ accumulation, 
by increasing the adverse effects of both inward and outward financialization. Our results 
suggest that, even though at low levels of financial development, an increase in financial 
development has a positive effect on investment through enhanced resource allocation, in 
countries with high levels of financial development a perverse effect dominates. A growth 
of the financial markets and intermediaries delinked from the financing requirements of 
NFCs is incentivizing the latter to heavily engage in non-operating (non-productive) 
activities, ultimately leading to stagnant levels of investment. We present robust evidence 
of a negative effect of financial development (as measured by the FD index) on NFCs’ 
capital accumulation via an amplified crowding-out effect of financial incomes. When 
companies’ financial (non-operating) activities are taken into account, the virtuous cycle 
between FD and investment described in Love and Zicchino (2006) is not confirmed. On the 
contrary, our results suggest that higher level of FD may induce NFCs to accumulate more 
financial assets, receive non-operational incomes, and use this liquidity to buy additional 
financial assets as opposed to physical assets related to their core business. Our finding at 
the microeconomic level highlight a further mechanism through which financial 
development negatively affects investment behaviour, in line with some new reservations 
put forward in the recent mainstream macroeconomic literature against the positive effect 
of a growing financial sector (e.g. Arcand et al., 2015).  
These results provide support to the theoretical arguments regarding the negative 
effects of financialization and confirm previous empirical findings at the macro and 
microeconomic levels in the literature for the US economy. The increasing interrelations 
between the financial markets and the NFCs are progressively reducing fixed capital 
accumulation, and thus growth. These results contrast with the conventional arguments 
regarding the beneficial effects of financial liberalization and financial deepening. 
The financialization of the European economic and social system has been favoured 
by a political processes aimed at the deregulation (liberalization) of financial markets and 
at the reduction of tax rates for corporations (Bieling, 2013). As we have seen, 
financialization had a fundamental role in depressing NFCs’ investment in Europe. To reach 
a stable and vigorous dynamic of investment, a de-financialization of the non-financial 
sector is desirable. This would require an extended regulation of companies’ non-operating 
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financial activities along with financial regulation. In addition, the estimated robust 
connection between past and present rates of investment (i.e. the ‘hysteresis’ of the 
investment processes) increases the potential effectiveness of de-financialization economic 
policies. 
Finally, we discuss some policies that could help reversing this process and allow a 
return to more stable and higher levels of investment. In light of our results, we organize 
our arguments at two levels. First, we discuss possible policies to contrast the negative 
consequences of financialization at the aggregate level. Second, we discuss tailored policies 
taking into account the roles of different stages of financial development as well as the size 
of the NFCs.  
Our results at the aggregate level show a negative effect of outward financialization 
(the impact of interest and dividends payments) that is common to all countries. This is in 
particular the case for large companies. Given that from the 1980s onwards, there has been 
an overall reduction in the interest rates, and a tendency of banking activities to move 
away from NFCs to household lending, the primary channel to focus on is the one of 
distributed dividends. Managers’ short termist behaviour and decisions exclusively aimed 
at maximizing dividends distributed to the shareholders should be disincentivized. What is 
needed is the provision of an institutional setting for the NFCs that encourage management 
orientation towards long term growth and, more generally, ‘stakeholder value’. Our 
analysis shows that this should be addressed in particular in the case of larger 
corporations.  
With respect to what we labelled as ‘inward financialization’, at the aggregate level 
we find a strong negative effect on investment of the NFCs in countries with high levels of 
FD, whilst this impact is slightly positive, albeit economically negligible, for the NFCs in 
countries with low FD. The positive effect is becoming considerable for smaller NFCs, but 
only in countries with low FD. On the contrary, we find that financial investment are 
crowding-out physical investment in all NFCs within an environment of high FD, 
irrespective of their size. These findings can be informative to design accurate de-
financialization polices. In fact, especially the crowding-out effect of financialization has not 
been addressed carefully, in particular because of the strength of the conventional idea that 
‘every additional fund is good for investment’.  
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Furthermore, in countries with high FD we find a weak (and relatively not robust) 
explanatory power of operating income. Consequently, it will be ineffective to further 
reduce NFCs income taxation, hoping for a recovery in the investment rate. The focus of 
corporate governance should rather be on the destination of the funds. The corporation 
today is an institution composed of different layers of productive and non-operating 
activities. A better policy of corporate governance would be the one aimed at favoring a 
productive destination of NFCs’ internal funds, i.e. higher rate of taxation on profits which 
are not invested.  
Given the negative effect of excessive financial development on NFCs’ investment, 
the policy recommendation for countries with low levels would be to prevent further de-
regulation of financial markets and/or intermediaries in order to avoid the negative effect 
associated with high levels of FD.  
In addition, a wider and renewed fiscal policy can be effective in reversing the 
financialization-led investment depletion. Apart from the re-regulation of the financial side 
of our economies (both at the macro and at the corporate levels), the reform of a 
financialized system needs coordinated public investments. In fact, the public sector can act 
as the catalyst and driver of a new phase in which NFCs’ objectives are essentially brought 
back to productive and stable capital accumulation. The main reason behind the missing 
link between profits and investment can be traced back to the consistent rise in the 
‘financialization-inequality mix’ (Stockhammer, 2015). The various waves of liberalization 
and privatisation of large part of the economics systems fostered the emergence of 
behaviours detached from the objectives of equality and prosperity. The evidence speaks in 
favour of a vast program of public investment that can provide a consistent and sustainable 
‘direction’ to the private initiative. Under the guidance of a macroeconomic policy 
framework focused on full employment and equality, which helps to define and improve 
the vector of choices of firms, shareholders themselves could see the long-term stability of 
the corporation as their main goal once again. 
Notwithstanding the above considerations, at the broader level of analysis of the 
political projects guiding the recent development of the European economy, there is also 
need for a critical reassessment of the process of European financial integration (Bieling 
2003, 2013). In fact, the project of European economic integration has been informed by a 
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set of concepts about the functioning of economic systems for which ‘the market’ is 
portrayed as the primary driver of growth, economic stability, and prosperity. Although 
this belief has proven to be too optimistic, especially after the 2007-8 financial meltdown 
and its consequences on European economies, supporters of this view are still strong. 
Reversing the financialization of the socio-economic system in general, and of NFCs 
accumulation in particular, would require an extensive socio-political ‘de-financialization 
reform package’, which goes beyond the mere fiscal and/or monetary policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
References  
Arellano, M., Bond, S. (1991). "Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations." The review of economic studies 
58(2):277-297. 
 
Arcand, J., Berkes, E. Panizza, U. (2015) “Too much finance?”  Journal of Economic Growth, 
20(2): 105-148. 
 
Arestis, P. and Demetriades, P.O. (1997), "Financial Development and Economic Growth: 
Assessing the Evidence", Economic Journal, 107(442):783-799. 
 
Arestis, P., Chortareas, G., Magkonis, G. (2015) “The Financial Development and Growth 
Nexus: A Meta‐Analysis.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(3):549-565. 
 
Arestis, P., González, A. R., Dejuán, Ó. (2012). “Modelling accumulation: A theoretical and 
empirical application of the accelerator principle under uncertainty”. European Journal of 
Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention 9(2):255-276. 
 
Arestis, P., Demetriades, P.O. and Luintel, K.B. (2001), "Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: The Role of Stock Markets", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 33(1):16-41. 
 
Beck, T., Degryse, H., Kneer, C. (2014). "Is more finance better? Disentangling intermediation 
and size effects of financial systems." Journal of Financial Stability 10:50-64. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Maksimovic V.  (2005) “Financial and legal constraints to firm 
growth: Does firm size matter?” Journal of Finance 60:137-77. 
 
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R. (2010), “Financial Institutions and Markets across 
Countries and over Time: The Updated Financial Development and Structure 
Database”, World Bank Economic Review 24(1):77-92. 
 
Beck T., Levine R., Loayza N. (2000). "Finance and the sources of growth". Journal of 
Financial Economics 58:261-300. 
 
Beck, T., Levine, R. (2004). “Stock markets, banks, and growth: Panel evidence.” Journal of 
Banking and Finance 28:423–442. 
 
Bieling, H. J. R. (2003). “Social forces in the making of the new European economy: The case of 
financial market integration”. New Political Economy, 8(2):203-224. 
 
Bieling, H. J. (2013). “European financial capitalism and the politics of (de-) 
financialization”. Competition & Change, 17(3):283-298. 
 
41 
 
Bloom, N., Bond, S., & Van Reenen, J. (2007). "Uncertainty and investment dynamics." The 
Review of Economic Studies 74(2):391-415. 
 
Blundell, R.; Bond, S.; Devereux, M.; Schiantarelli, F. (1992). "Investment and Tobin's <i> Q 
</i>: Evidence from company panel data". Journal of Econometrics 51(1):233-257. 
 
Bond S. R., Elston J. A., Mairesse J., Mulkay B. (2003). "Financial Factors and Investment in 
Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom: a Comparison Using Company Panel 
Data". The Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1):153-16.  
 
Bond, S. R. and Cummins, J. G. (2001). "Noisy share prices and the Q model of investment". IFS 
Working Papers, No.01/22. 
 
Bond, S., & Meghir, C. (1994). "Dynamic investment models and the firm's financial policy". 
The Review of Economic Studies 61(2):197-222. 
 
Bond, S., Klemm, A., Newton-Smith, R., Syed, M., Vlieghe, G. (2004). "The roles of expected 
profitability, Tobin's Q and cash flow in econometric models of company investment".  IFS 
Working Papers, No. 04/12. 
 
Botta, A., Caverzasi, E., & Tori, D. (2016). “The macroeconomics of Shadow Banking”. 
Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, No. 40. Available at: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/15616/ 
 
Brainard, W. C., Tobin, J. (1968). "Pitfalls in financial model building". American Economic 
Review 58(2):99-122. 
 
Brown, J., Fazzari, S. and Petersen, B. (2009). "Financing innovation and growth: cash flow, 
external equity and the 1990s R&D boom". The Journal of Finance 64(1):151-185. 
 
Cecchetti, S.G., Kharroubi, E. (2012). "Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth". BIS 
Working Paper Series, No. 381.  
 
Chirinko, R. S. (1993). "Business fixed investment spending: Modelling strategies, empirical 
results, and policy implications". Journal of Economic Literature 31:1875-1911. 
 
Chirinko, R. S., Schaller H. (1995). "Why Does Liquidity Matter in Investment Equations?". 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27(2):527-548. 
 
Chung, K., Pruitt, S. (1994). “A Simple Approximation of Tobin’s Q”. Financial Management 
23:70-74. 
 
Cleary, S. (1999). "The relationship between firm investment and financial status". The 
Journal of Finance 54(2):673-692. 
 
42 
 
Cournède, B., O. Denk and P. Hoeller (2015). "Finance and Inclusive Growth", OECD 
Economic Policy Papers, No. 14, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5js06pbhf28s-en 
 
Cordonnier, L., Van de Velde F. (2015). “The demands of finance and the glass ceiling of 
profit without investment”. Cambridge Journal of Economics 39(3):871-885. 
 
Davis, L. (2016). “Identifying the ‘financialization’ of the nonfinancial corporation in the U.S. 
economy: A decomposition of firm-level balance sheets”. Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics 39(1):115-141. 
 
Dallery, T. (2009). "Post-Keynesian theories of the firm under financialization." Review of 
Radical Political Economics 41(4):492-515. 
 
De Ridder, A. (2009). “Share repurchases and firm behaviour”. International Journal of 
Theoretical and Applied Finance 12(05):605-631. 
 
Demirgüc-Kunt, A., Levine, R. (1996) “Stock market development and financial 
intermediaries: Stylized facts.” World Bank Economic Review, 10:291–321. 
 
Demir, F. (2007). “The rise of rentier capitalism and the financialization of real sectors in 
developing countries”. Review of Radical Political Economics, 39(3): 351-359. 
 
Demir, F. (2009). “Financial liberalization, private investment and portfolio choice: 
financialization of real sectors in emerging markets”. Journal of Development Economics 
88(2):314-324. 
 
Devereux, M., Schiantarelli, F. (1990). “Investment, financial factors, and cash flow: Evidence 
from UK panel data.” In “Asymmetric information, corporate finance, and investment”,  pp. 
279-306. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Duménil, G., Levy, D. (2004). "Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neo-Liberal Revolution". 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (USA). 
 
Epstein, G. A. (2005). “Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy” in Epstein G. 
A. (ed.), "Financialization and the World Economy". Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Evans, M. K. (1967). "A study of industry investment decisions". The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 49:151-164. 
 
Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C. (1988). "Financing constraints and corporate 
investment". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:141-195. 
 
Fazzari, S. M., Petersen, B. C. (1993). "Working capital and fixed investment: new evidence on 
financing constraints". The RAND Journal of Economics 24(3):328-342. 
 
43 
 
Fazzari, S., Mott, T., (1986). “The investment theories of Kalecki and Keynes: an empirical 
study of firm data, 1970-1982”. Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 9(2):171-187. 
 
Ford, R., Poret, P. (1991). “Business investment: recent performance and some implications 
for policy”. OECD Economic Studies 16:79-131. 
 
Foster, J. B. (2010). “The Financialization of Accumulation”. Monthly Review 62(5):1-17. 
Gilchrist, S., Himmelberg, C. P. (1995). “Evidence on the role of cash flow for investment.” 
Journal of monetary Economics, 36(3):541-572. 
 
Guariglia, A. and Carpenter, R. (2008). "Cash-flow, investment, and investment opportunities: 
new tests using UK Panel data", Journal of banking finance 32(9):1894-1906. 
 
Hayashi, F., Inoue T. (1991). "The relation between firm growth and q with multiple capital 
goods: theory and evidence from Japanese panel data". Econometrica 59(3):731-754. 
 
Hein, E. (2013). "Finance-dominated capitalism and re-distribution of income: a Kaleckian 
perspective". Cambridge Journal of Economics, bet038. 
 
Hein, E., van Treeck, T. (2008). “Financialisation in Post-Keynesian models of distribution and 
growth-a systematic review” (No. 10). IMK at the Hans Boeckler Foundation, 
 Macroeconomic Policy Institute. 
 
Hubbard, R. G. (1998). "Capital-market imperfections and investment". Journal of Economic 
Literature 36(1):193-225. 
 
Jorgenson, D. W. (1963). “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior.” American Economic 
Review, Papers and Proceedings 53:247-259. 
 
Jorgenson, D. W. (1971). "Econometric studies of investment behavior: a survey". Journal of 
Economic Literature 9(4):1111-1147. 
 
Kadapakkam, P. R., Kumar, P. C., Riddick, L. A. (1998). "The impact of cash flows and firm 
size on investment: The international evidence". Journal of Banking & Finance 22(3):293-
320. 
 
Kalecki, M. (1954). “Theory of Economic Dynamics”. London: George Allen and Unwin. 
 
Karwowski E., Stockhammer E. “Financialisation in Emerging Economies: A Systematic 
Overview and Comparison with Anglo-Saxon Economies”, PKSG Working Paper Series. 
Available at http://www.postkeynesian.net/downloads/working-papers/PKWP1616.pdf 
 
King, R. G., Levine, R.  (1993). “Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be right". Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 108(3):7I 7-737. 
 
44 
 
Kliman, A., Williams S.D. (2014). “Why ‘financialisation’ hasn’t depressed US productive 
investment”. Cambridge Journal of Economics, beu033. 
 
Kohler K., Guschanski A., Stockhammer E. (2016). “How does financialisation affect 
functional income distribution? A theoretical clarification and empirical assessment.” Socio-
Economic Review, doi: 10.1093/ser/mww009 
 
Kopcke, R. W., Brauman, R. S. (2001). “The performance of traditional macroeconomic 
models of businesses' investment spending”. New England Economic Review, pp. 3-39. 
 
Krippner, G. R. (2005). “The financialization of the American economy”. Socio-Economic 
Review, 3(2):173-208. 
 
Kuh, E. and Meyer, J. (1955). "Acceleration and related theories of investment: an empirical 
inquiry". Review of Economics and Statistics 38(3):217–230. 
 
Lapavitsas, C. (2009). “Financialised Capitalism: Crisis and Financial Expropriation”. 
Historical Materialism, 17(2):114-148. 
 
Lapavitsas C., Powell J. (2013) "Financialisation varied: a comparative analysis of advanced 
economies" Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, 6(3):359–379. 
 
Lavoie, M. (2014) “Post-Keynesian economics. New Foundations." Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Law, S. H., Singh, N. (2014). "Does too much finance harm economic growth?" Journal of 
Banking & Finance 41(1):36-44. 
 
Lazonick, W., O'Sullivan, M. (2000). "Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for 
corporate governance". Economy and society 29(1):13-35. 
 
Lindenberg, E., Ross, S. (1981). “Tobin’s q and industrial organization”. Journal of Business 
54:1-32 
 
Lopez, J., Mott, T. (1999). “Kalecki versus Keynes on the Determinants of Investment.” Review 
of Political Economy, 11(3):291-301. 
 
Love, I. (2003). "Financial development and financing constraints: International evidence 
from the structural investment model." Review of Financial studies 16(3):765-791. 
 
Love, I., Zicchino, L. (2006). "Financial development and dynamic investment behavior: 
Evidence from panel VAR." The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 46(2):190-210. 
 
Ndikumana L. (1999). "Debt Service, Financing Constraints, and Fixed Investment: Evidence 
from Panel Data". Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 21(3):455-478. 
 
45 
 
Onaran, Ö., Stockhammer, E., Grafl, L. (2010). “Financialisation, income distribution and 
aggregate demand in the USA”. Cambridge Journal of Economics 35(4):637-661. 
 
Orhangazi, Ö. (2008a). “Financialization and the US Economy”. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Orhangazi, Ö. (2008b). “Financialisation and capital accumulation in the non-financial 
corporate sector: A theoretical and empirical investigation on the US economy: 1973–2003”. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics 32(6):863-886. 
 
Pawlina, G., Renneboog, L. (2005). "Is Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency 
Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK". European Financial Management 
11(4):483-513. 
 
Rappaport, A. (1999). “Creating shareholder value: a guide for managers and investors”. New 
York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Robinson, J. (1952)."The Generalization of the General Theory". In "The rate of interest, and 
other essays", pp. 67- 142. London: Macmillan. 
 
Roodman, D. (2009). "How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system GMM in 
Stata". Stata Journal 9(1):86-136. 
 
Sahay, R., Čihák, M., Papa N’Diaye, A., Barajas, R. B., Ayala, D., Gao, Y., Yousefi, S. R. (2015). 
“Rethinking Financial Deepening: Stability and Growth in Emerging Markets.” IMF discussion 
note SDN/15/08. 
 
Stiglitz, J. E., Weiss, A. (1981). "Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information". 
American Economic Review 71:393-410. 
 
Stockhammer E. (2004). "Financialisation and the slowdown of accumulation". Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 28(5):719-741. 
 
Stockhammer E. (2006). "Shareholder value orientation and the investment-profit puzzle". 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics 28(2):193-215. 
 
Stockhammer, E. (2015). “Rising inequality as a cause of the present crisis”. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 39(3):935-958. 
 
Tori D., Onaran, Ö. (2015). “The effects of financialization on investment: evidence from firm-
level data for the UK”. Greenwich Papers in Political Economy, No. 17. Available at: 
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/14068 
 
Tori, D., and Onaran, Ö. (2016), "Financialization and the global race to the bottom in 
accumulation", 
UNCTAD Working Paper, (forthcoming) 
 
46 
 
Valickova, P., Havranek, T., Horvath, R. (2015) “Financial Development and Economic 
Growth: A Meta‐Analysis.” Journal of Economic Surveys, 29(3):506-526. 
 
van Treeck, T. (2008). "Reconsidering the investment–profit nexus in finance-led economies: 
an ardl-based approach". Metroeconomica 59(3):371–404. 
 
Windmeijer, F. (2005). “A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step 
GMM estimators”. Journal of econometrics 126(1):25-51. 
 
 
  
47 
 
Figures and Tables   
 
Figure 1. Additions to fixed assets/operating income (I/π), NFCs, Europe14 and selected 
countries, 1995-2015  
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data. 
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Figure 2. Financial assets/fixed assets (FA/K), NFCs, Europe14  and selected countries, 
1995-2015 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
Figure 3. The change in reinvested profits (I/π), and the change in the accumulation 
of financial assets (FA/K), NFCs, selected European countries, 1995-2007 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
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Figure 4. Investment/Fixed Assets (I/K), total financial payments/fixed assets (F/K), and 
total financial profits/fixed assets (πF/K, RHA), NFCs, Europe, 1995-2015 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
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Figures5-18. Investment/Fixed Assets (I/K), total payments/fixed 
assets (F/K), and total financial profits/fixed assets (πF/K, RHA), NFCs 
Figure 3_ UK.  
 
 
 
Figure 4_ France.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5_ Germany  
 
Figure 6_ Italy 
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Figure 7_ Spain  
 
Figure 8_ Sweden  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 91_ The Netherlands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12_ Ireland  
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Figure 13_ Finland.   
 
 
Figure 14_ Greece.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 15_ Denmark.   
 
Figure 10_ Portugal.   
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Figure 11_ Belgium.   
 
Figure 12_ Austria.   
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Financial development index (average value, 1995-2007) 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on World Bank data, Global financial development database
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Table 1. Estimation results, EU 14, dependent variable (I/K) 
Variable (1)
I
 (2)
II
 (3)
III
 
    
         0.299
***
 0.321*** 0.306*** 
 (0.050) (0.042) (0.050) 
         -0.059
**
  -0.057** 
 (0.024)              (0.028) 
         0.303
***
 0.225***  0.219*** 
 (0.074) (0.081) (0.055) 
         0.596
***
 0.350**  0.416** 
 (0.207) (0.177) (0.181) 
              0.030
***
 0.005   0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.012)  (0.010) 
                    0.045 
   (0.031) 
          -0.070
***
 -0.071
**
 -0.067
**
 
 (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) 
          -0.032
**
 -0.031* -0.047** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.020) 
                0.098
**
 
   (0.042) 
                0.176
**
 
   (0.073) 
         -0.122
***
 -0.155*** -0.049*** 
 (0.046) (0.059)  (0.018) 
         -0.112
***
 -0.099**  
 (0.043) (0.045)  
               -0.141
**
 
   (0.063) 
            -0.031
***
 -0.025** -0.016* 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) 
       0.117
*
 0.155
**
   0.149
***
 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.033) 
Number of Observations 25726 12551 25726 
Number of Firms 2881 2201 2881 
Number of Instruments 36 29 36 
p-value Hanses test 0.749 0.345 0.159 
p-value A-B test (AR 2) 0.607 0.348 0.445 
Time effects yes yes yes 
p-value Wald test for  
time effects 
0.001 0.000 0.003 
p-value                                   0.009 
p-value                        0.051 
p-value                         0.003 
Weighted regression (w=1/total country obs.). Specifications I and II  are based on Equation (1), specification III is 
based on Equation (2), two-step difference-GMM estimations. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. 
Robust corrected standard error in parenthesis. * significant at 10%, ** significant ant 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1a. Estimation results, selected countries, 1995-2015, dependent variable (I/K)t 
  UK SWE GER SPA ITA FRA 
         
0.409*** 0.283*** 0.393*** 0.457*** 0.275*** 0.280*** 
(0.029) (0.065) (0.101) (0.066) (0.041) (0.046) 
         
0.310*** 0.224** 0.731* 0.461*** 0.256** 0.513*** 
(0.061) (0.108) (0.374) (0.177) (0.124) (0.086) 
              
0.023* 0.121* 0.025 0.011 0.055
* 0.016 
(0.013) (0.065) (0.020) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) 
          
-0.036** -0.107** -0.062* -0.053** -0.033* -0.094*** 
(0.016) (0.049) (0.033) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) 
          
 -0.059
**    -0.040
*** 
 (0.025)    (0.015) 
         
-0.091*** -0.026 -0.063
*** -0.383*** 0.003 -0.130
** 
(0.017) (0.030) (0.021) (0.100) (0.049) (0.062) 
       
0.172***     0.226
*** 
(0.028)     (0.074) 
       
-0.059
***
      
(0.020)      
Number of Observations 9481 1998 3438 1039 1456 3557 
Number of Firms 915 231 400 116 176 417 
Number of Instruments 30 32 38 30 33 35 
p-value Hanses test 0.184 0.451 0.262 0.411 0.427 0.523 
p-value A-B test (AR 2) 0.170 0.613 0.193 0.320 0.874 0.165 
Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
p-value Wald test for  
time effects 
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
All specification based on Equation (1), two-step difference-GMM estimations. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. Robust corrected standard error in 
parenthesis * significant at 10%, ** significant ant 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 1b. Estimation results, selected countries, 1995-2015, dependent variable (I/K)t 
 AUT DNK FNL BLG PRT IRL GRE NTH 
         0.378
*** 0.191** 0.348*** 0.096  0.269*** 0.432* 0.382**  0.294*** 
 (0.092) (0.084) (0.056) (0.069)      (0.102) (0.251) (0.175) (0.089) 
         0.751
*** 0.501* 0.534*** 0.036 1.302* 0.732 0.477 0.191** 
 (0.207) (0.287) (0.205) (0.155) (0.792) (0.550) (0.398) (0.088) 
              0.045 0.075
** 0.010 0.068** -0.067 0.024 -0.025 0.011 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.052) (0.025)  (0.064) (0.095) (0.045) (0.027) 
          
-0.214** 0.081 0.033 0.049* -0.050 -0.147** -0.032 -0.076** 
(0.084) (0.071) (0.035) (0.030) (0.075) (0.058) (0.051) (0.034) 
         0.024 -0.249
** -0.238*** 0.034   -0.435*** -0.528* 0.254 -0.097*** 
 (0.092) (0.098) (0.091) (0.074)  (0.158) (0.269) (0.164) (0.037) 
       0.151
* 0.245**      -0.252*** 
 (0.092) (0.119)      (0.064) 
 Number of Observations 470 708 561 684 314 536 580 904 
 Number of Firms 76 89 84 82 54 55 92 94 
 Number of Instruments 34 34 32 32 32 32 32 34 
 p-value Hanses test 0.735 0.485 0.468 0.445 0.085 0.097 0.599 0.410 
p-value A-B test (AR 2) 0.242 0.727 0.022 0.696 0.427 0.909 0.622 0.001 
 Time effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 p-value Wald test for  
 time effects 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.011 
All specification based on Equation (1), two-step difference-GMM estimations. Coefficients for the year dummies are not reported. Robust corrected standard error in 
parenthesis * significant at 10%, ** significant ant 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 2. Estimation results, aggregate European 14, dependent variable (I/K)t 
 (1)
I
 (2)
II
 (3)
III
 (4)
IV
 
           0.304
*** 0.372*** 0.326***    0.328*** 
 (0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) 
         - 0.054
**  - 0.050**  
 (0.022)  (0.021)  
           0.238
*** 0.184*** 0.210*** 0.218*** 
 (0.053) (0.082) (0.049) (0.082) 
         0.176
**  0.192** 0.096** 
 (0.085)  (0.080) (0.044) 
              0.037
** 0.011* 0.038*** 0.015* 
 (0.016) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
                   0.556
** 0.221* 0.451** 0.275** 
 (0.218) (0.118) (0.201) (0.132) 
          - 0.156
*** - 0.132*** - 0.142*** - 0.158*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.035) (0.042) 
          - 0.111
*** - 0.099*** - 0.101*** - 0.083*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) 
               0.180
***   0.167***  0.148*** 0.162*** 
 (0.043)        (0.046) (0.037) (0.050) 
               0.163
***  0.187***  0.150*** 0.140** 
 (0.048)        (0.049) (0.045) (0.055) 
                 0.081
***   0.104** 
   (0.031)  (0.047) 
         - 0.068
*** - 0.081*  - 0.062*** - 0.107* 
 (0.026) 0.044 (0.020)  (0.060) 
              - 0.152
*** - 0.050  - 0.143***  - 0.079** 
 (0.054) (0.036) (0.052)  (0.031) 
               0.078
* 0.287 
    (0.047)  (0.204) 
            - 0.016
**  - 0.030*** - 0.015**  - 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)  (0.009) 
                 - 0.070
***  0.056***  - 0.072***   0.048** 
 (0.025) (0.021) (0.028)  (0.021) 
       0.182
*** 0.157**  0.170***    0.113*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.031)  (0.033) 
Number of Observation 25726 14672 25726 14672 
Number of Firms 2881 2330 2881 2330 
Number of Instruments 46 44 48 44 
p-value Hanses test 0.281 0.494 0.237 0.378 
p-value A-B test (AR 2) 0.244 0.496 0.239 0.413 
Time effects yes yes yes yes  
p-value                       
   1      
0.008 0.049 0.019 0.028 
p-value                       0.013 0.001 0.075 0.123 
p-value                        0.000 0.027 0.000 0.009 
p-value                            0.001 0.182 0.003 0.329 
p-value  
  
 
                                        0.002 0.065 
p-value  
  
 
                       0.000 0.000 
p-value                                               0.702 0.328 
p-value                                                   0.293 0.302 
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  Table 3. Economic effects by country, disaggregation by level of financial development (FD) 1995-2007 
 
 
The economic effects for single countries are based on estimated elasticities in Table 2, Column 2, specification 3. The economic effects for Europe are 
based on estimated elasticities in Table 1, Column 2, specification 1. 
 
 
  
Country FD
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
Germany HD 0.293 0.747 0.219 0.018 2.911 0.052 -0.368 1.319 -0.485 -0.129 0.442 -0.057 -0.048 0.029 -0.001
Spain HD 0.293 0.135 0.040 0.018 0.536 0.010 -0.368 0.713 -0.262 -0.129 0.517 -0.067 -0.048 0.391 -0.019
Finland HD 0.293 1.227 0.360 0.018 1.140 0.021 -0.368 0.771 -0.284 -0.129 1.017 -0.131 -0.048 -0.300 0.014
France HD 0.293 0.783 0.229 0.018 1.003 0.018 -0.368 0.423 -0.156 -0.129 0.508 -0.065 -0.048 0.050 -0.002
The Netherlands HD 0.293 0.614 0.180 0.018 0.412 0.007 -0.368 0.789 -0.290 -0.129 -0.044 0.006 -0.048 0.070 -0.003
Sweden HD 0.293 1.830 0.536 0.018 1.391 0.025 -0.368 1.927 -0.709 -0.129 1.866 -0.241 -0.048 -0.051 0.002
UK HD 0.293 0.842 0.247 0.018 1.273 0.023 -0.368 1.367 -0.503 -0.129 1.029 -0.133 -0.048 0.233 -0.011
Belgium LD 0.293 0.509 0.149 0.369 1.428 0.527 0.196 0.387 0.076 -0.209 0.727 -0.152 0.000 0.042 0.000
Denmark LD 0.293 0.714 0.209 0.369 0.675 0.249 0.196 0.183 0.036 -0.209 1.226 -0.256 0.000 0.108 0.000
Greece LD 0.293 -0.211 -0.062 0.369 -0.284 -0.105 0.196 0.099 0.019 -0.209 -0.301 0.063 0.000 0.289 0.000
Ireland LD 0.293 1.315 0.385 0.369 1.333 0.492 0.196 -0.015 -0.003 -0.209 0.910 -0.190 0.000 -0.049 0.000
Italy LD 0.293 0.861 0.252 0.369 1.050 0.387 0.196 0.276 0.054 -0.209 0.575 -0.120 0.000 -0.012 0.000
Austria LD 0.293 0.067 0.020 0.369 1.004 0.370 0.196 0.168 0.033 -0.209 1.273 -0.266 0.000 0.055 0.000
Portugal LD 0.293 0.749 0.219 0.369 0.165 0.061 0.196 1.300 0.255 -0.209 0.514 -0.107 0.000 0.455 0.000
Europe 0.847 0.727 0.616 0.000 1.003 0.000 -0.150 0.693 -0.104 -0.374 0.733 -0.274 -0.037 0.093 -0.003
ΔTD/TAS/K π/K πF/K F/K
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Table 4. Economic effects by country, disaggregation by level of financial development (FD) and by size, 1995-2007 
 
The economic effects for single countries are based on estimated elasticities in Table 2, specification 4.  The economic effects for Europe are based on 
estimated elasticities in Table 1, Column 3, specification 2. 
Country FD SIZE
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulativ
e Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
LARGE -0.359 1.093 -0.392 -0.159 0.358 -0.057
SMALL -0.204 1.755 -0.358 0.000 0.466 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.588 -0.211 -0.159 0.569 -0.091
SMALL -0.204 1.444 -0.294 0.000 0.287 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.720 -0.258 -0.159 1.261 -0.201
SMALL -0.204 1.193 -0.243 0.000 0.891 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.449 -0.161 -0.159 0.412 -0.066
SMALL -0.204 1.760 -0.359 0.000 0.933 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.684 -0.245 -0.159 0.189 -0.030
SMALL -0.204 1.070 -0.218 0.000 -0.745 0.000
LARGE -0.359 1.310 -0.470 -0.159 1.670 -0.266
SMALL -0.204 2.417 -0.493 0.000 2.129 0.000
LARGE -0.359 1.154 -0.414 -0.159 1.004 -0.160
SMALL -0.204 1.715 -0.350 0.000 1.381 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.394 0.000 -0.277 2.232 -0.618
SMALL 0.604 1.849 1.117 0.000 1.885 0.000
LARGE 0.000 -0.724 0.000 -0.277 1.209 -0.335
SMALL 0.604 0.325 0.196 0.000 1.284 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.052 0.000 -0.277 -0.279 0.077
SMALL 0.604 0.926 0.560 0.000 -0.264 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.578 0.000 -0.277 0.518 -0.143
SMALL 0.604 3.674 2.219 0.000 1.727 0.000
LARGE 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.277 0.475 -0.131
SMALL 0.604 0.990 0.598 0.000 1.503 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.210 0.000 -0.277 1.064 -0.294
SMALL 0.604 -0.681 -0.411 0.000 2.205 0.000
LARGE 0.000 1.261 0.000 -0.277 0.555 -0.153
SMALL 0.604 -0.205 -0.124 0.000 0.179 0.000
LARGE -0.179 0.560 -0.100 -0.077 0.802 -0.062
SMALL 0.242 1.302 0.315 -0.270 0.990 -0.268
0.000LD 0.467 0.749 0.350 0.432 0.165 0.071 0.000 0.455
ΔTD/TA
0.5360.0220.0630.135
Belgium
UK
Sweden
The Netherlands
France
S/K (π-CD)/K πF/K F/K
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.714 0.333
0.022
Italy
Austria
Europe
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
LD
LD
LD
LD
LD
LD
Denmark 
Germany
Finland
Greece
Ireland
HDSpain
Portugal
0.509 0.238
-0.211
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.747 0.349
1.227 0.573
0.783 0.366
0.614 0.287
1.830 0.854
0.614
-0.099
0.861 0.402
0.727 0.725
0.067 0.031
0.467
0.467
0.997
0.412 0.009
0.022 1.140 0.025
0.012
0.842 0.393
0.053 1.003 0.054
0.432 0.4331.004
0.432 -0.284 -0.123
0.432 1.050 0.453
0.432 1.333 0.5751.315
-0.043 0.029 -0.001
-0.043 0.050 -0.002
0.432 0.675 0.291
0.022 1.273 0.028
0.022 1.390 0.031
0.432 1.428 0.616
0.022 2.911 0.064
0.022 1.003 0.022
0.000
0.000 -0.012 0.000
-0.049 0.000
-0.043 -0.051 0.002
0.000 0.042 0.000
0.000 0.055 0.000
-0.043 0.391 -0.017
-0.025 0.093 -0.002
-0.043 -0.300 0.013
-0.043 0.070 -0.003
-0.043 0.233 -0.010
0.000 0.108 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.289
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Appendix  
Table 1A. Variables definition and codes. 
Symbol Variable Definition Worldscope Code 
I Investment Addition to fixed assets WC04601 
K Capital stock Net fixed capital stock WC02501 
S Sales Net sales WC01001 
π Net profit rate Operating income-depreciation WC01250-WC04051 
F Financial Payments Interest + cash dividends paid 
WC01251+  
WC04551 
πF Non-operating profit 
Non-operating profit from 
interest and dividends 
WC01266+  
WC01268 
FA Financial assets 
Cash, other investment, short-
term investment 
WC02003+ WC02250+ 
WC02008 
Q Average Tobin’s Q23 
(Market share price*common 
share outstanding + total 
liabilities)/total assets 
               
       
 
TD Total debt   
sum of long-term and short-term 
debt 
        
FD 
Financial 
Development 
Standardized average of Stock 
market and financial intermediaries 
development over GDP 
Index1 + Findex1  
A more detailed guide about variables is available a t the link:  
http://lipas.uwasa.fi/~jaty/thomson/worldscope_def.pdf (last accessed 21/08/2016
                                                          
23
 This is a proxy for average firms’ market evaluation (Chung and Pruitt, 1994) based on the work of Lindenberg 
and Ross (1981).  
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Table 2A. Summary statistic for the aggregate sample 
Variable               Mean           Std. Dev.              Observations 
       
     overall 0.25  0.20  N =      25726 
  between 0.16  1.10  n =      2881 
  within 0.14     -0.442  T-bar =  15.9 
       
     overall 13.49  28.98  N =      25726 
  between 33.92  0.062  n =      2881 
  within 15.60     -281.82  T-bar =  15.6 
       
         overall 0.66  2.50  N =       25726 
  between 2.10     -17.98  n =       2881 
  within 1.93     -74.66  T-bar =   15.1 
       
           overall 0.032  0.12  N =       25726 
  between 0.056  0.89  n =       2881 
  within 0.10  -.86  T-bar =   15.8 
       
          overall 0.46  3.41  N =       25726 
  between 2.79  85.69  n =       2881 
  within 2.59  -85.19 T-bar =   15.1 
      
     overall 0.38  0.26  N =       25726 
  between 0.22  0.97  n =       2881 
  within 0.18      -0.25  T-bar =   15.2 
       
      overall 2.44  13.77  N =       25726 
  between 9.86  0.10  n =       2881 
  within 10.48    -317.04  T-bar =   15.6 
 
   overall 1.54  0.99  N =       25329 
  between 0.71  0.34  n =       2864 
  within 0.73     -3.43  T-bar =   15.7 
       
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
N = number of total observations, n= number of groups, T-bar = average time period  
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Table 3A. Sample coverage across countries, and by size  
 
 
Source: authors’ calculation based on Worldscope data 
 
  
 (a) Number of 
observations 
(b) Share of total 
observations 
(c) Number 
of firms 
(d) Share of total 
firms 
(e) Firms with avg. 
Ta < 20pTa (%) 
(f) Firms with avg. 
Ta >80pTa (%) 
Difference                
(f-e) 
Country        
Austria 470 0,02 76 0,03 12 (15,79) 18 (23,68)  7,89 
Belgium 684 0,03 82 0,03 21 (25,61) 28 (34,15)  8,54 
Denmark 708 0,03 89 0,03 18 (20,22) 32 (35,96) 15,73 
Finland 561 0,02 84 0,03 24 (28,57) 36 (42,86) 14,29 
France 3557 0,14 417 0,14 109(26,14) 132(31,65)  5,52 
Germany 3438 0,13 400 0,14 85 (21,25) 119(29,75)  8,50 
Greece 580 0,02 92 0,03 38 (41,30) 49 (53,26) 11,96 
Ireland 536 0,02 55 0,02  6 (10,91) 11 (20,00)  9,09 
Italy 1456 0,06 176 0,06 36 (20,45) 56 (31,82) 11,36 
Netherlands 904 0,04 94 0,03 19 (20,21) 34 (36,21) 15,96 
Portugal 314 0,01 54 0,02  7 (12,96) 11 (20,37)  7,41 
Spain 1039 0,04 116 0,04 35 (30,17) 60 (51,72) 21,55 
Sweden 1998 0,08 231 0,08 55 (23,81)      68 (29,44)  5,63 
United Kingdom 9481 0,37 915 0,32 180(19,67) 276(30,16) 10,49 
Europe 25726 1,00 2881 1,00 645(22,39) 930(32,28)  9,89 
63 
 
Table 5A. Disaggregated measure of financial development by country, period 1995-2007 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 
Country Indicator Name 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
AUT Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 92.66 95.67 102.35 100.85 99.34 102.62 105.07 104.58 104.81 105.97 115.63 116.37 115.44 120.29
AUT Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 89.57 89.78 89.86 88.38 87.64 86.90 87.54 86.98 87.99 88.65 91.44 93.17 95.02 100.72
AUT Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 14.12 13.89 15.71 16.25 15.43 15.23 14.03 13.90 18.39 25.15 34.60 48.72 58.17 38.60
AUT Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 9.35 9.66 7.23 6.92 6.71 5.08 4.29 3.24 3.50 6.10 11.44 19.35 27.63 28.47
AUT Stock market turnover ratio (%) 76.45 62.97 37.22 50.75 35.66 32.08 26.96 20.16 23.15 32.51 43.49 50.26 55.65 65.38
BEL Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 72.71 74.98 75.54 78.03 80.52 77.83 75.95 74.04 73.81 71.19 73.76 82.03 90.89 93.90
BEL Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 76.66 80.79 83.24 85.60 86.79 87.97 87.83 89.62 94.12 98.11 103.05 104.38 103.74 106.88
BEL Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 35.35 39.93 48.31 74.54 82.79 73.82 74.29 60.04 52.66 64.43 75.07 86.01 88.95 58.43
BEL Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 5.26 7.37 10.50 16.58 22.06 19.27 16.88 15.31 13.42 17.61 27.42 36.64 47.29 48.62
BEL Stock market turnover ratio (%) 15.16 23.72 24.62 29.06 28.06 22.13 23.80 22.27 25.99 34.36 44.38 48.23 62.54 71.44
DNK Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 30.85 31.53 32.09 34.98 34.87 135.33 142.56 145.47 151.62 158.16 171.78 185.68 202.50 216.32
DNK Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 54.88 56.10 57.27 58.14 56.46 51.43 49.36 49.94 51.52 53.37 57.60 61.39 65.32 70.10
DNK Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 32.52 34.22 45.96 55.38 57.68 62.21 60.23 49.33 50.48 58.42 64.19 75.21 85.02 63.45
DNK Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 15.74 16.22 22.67 33.72 37.50 45.44 49.81 36.62 30.45 35.05 48.55 60.49 69.75 69.59
DNK Stock market turnover ratio (%) 43.84 54.93 59.85 73.33 62.08 91.94 73.02 60.13 62.42 68.17 91.93 85.61 91.46 97.55
FIN Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 61.86 59.42 53.12 51.96 53.31 53.15 55.92 58.34 64.18 67.60 75.05 78.80 81.52 85.98
FIN Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 55.23 54.29 49.90 47.35 49.08 48.80 47.31 49.14 52.22 52.58 54.27 54.72 55.56 61.36
FIN Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 34.51 41.09 52.65 86.90 190.40 246.05 192.39 125.96 102.80 98.37 100.75 114.61 134.15 103.11
FIN Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 13.35 15.85 22.88 36.83 65.64 125.12 153.42 135.36 114.53 105.95 126.40 152.05 189.79 181.66
FIN Stock market turnover ratio (%) 42.10 42.53 56.16 53.49 45.75 68.96 74.66 103.64 96.81 118.31 138.66 149.71 164.56 139.22
FRA Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 86.04 82.91 82.01 81.81 81.61 85.13 87.90 85.95 88.66 90.61 92.67 98.43 105.58 108.76
FRA Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 63.33 66.23 67.65 35.19 35.28 65.28 65.46 66.92 69.96 72.43 73.67 73.89 74.38 78.87
FRA Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 32.62 35.10 42.10 56.43 82.95 102.82 96.57 76.43 70.21 74.34 77.87 93.36 104.66 79.64
FRA Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 22.51 20.22 22.76 33.67 46.32 66.53 79.68 71.75 62.14 64.05 69.06 89.78 118.64 123.47
FRA Stock market turnover ratio (%) 71.08 50.20 67.27 71.33 65.19 79.44 83.36 84.22 87.72 92.65 91.73 118.93 126.49 144.80
DEU Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 100.42 106.35 110.61 116.67 116.31 119.45 118.80 117.52 116.29 112.93 112.59 109.60 105.25 108.61
DEU Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 64.62 67.50 69.35 70.34 85.62 98.01 96.95 98.69 101.57 103.27 105.42 106.28 108.02 115.64
DEU Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 22.05 25.09 32.77 43.82 58.16 66.35 61.38 45.37 39.27 43.65 43.65 49.32 58.37 46.73
DEU Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 21.75 27.01 28.10 29.64 36.25 46.82 65.31 67.97 54.11 48.87 57.21 73.29 91.09 93.04
DEU Stock market turnover ratio (%) 103.09 125.74 75.78 79.82 65.73 85.42 122.96 135.43 120.51 118.15 146.01 173.70 173.33 183.39
GRC Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 30.28 31.28 32.43 34.38 41.70 47.40 57.41 61.00 64.77 70.79 79.59 85.24 93.91 97.41
GRC Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 53.91 56.14 56.17 54.71 55.33 55.90 73.05 86.74 79.80 78.68 85.22 88.45 91.78 101.29
GRC Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 12.47 14.65 20.44 41.03 103.22 115.35 74.39 54.67 48.93 53.09 56.32 67.46 80.10 55.36
GRC Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 4.37 5.11 10.38 24.38 85.93 103.73 49.94 21.99 17.69 18.80 22.60 32.94 43.70 31.15
GRC Stock market turnover ratio (%) 37.44 40.97 76.42 84.39 137.28 66.27 38.69 31.15 40.90 35.94 48.27 60.88 61.94 25.47
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Table 5A (continued). Disaggregated measure of financial development by country, period 1995-2007  
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD)
Country Indicator Name 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
IRL Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 68.71 73.26 82.08 87.17 101.23 104.61 109.72 108.79 113.78 133.37 159.91 181.04 200.15 221.64
IRL Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 58.43 68.81 69.75 71.90 75.74 77.97 77.50 76.20 78.08 82.39 87.61 93.95 98.21 107.23
IRL Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 52.81 40.63 50.34 64.14 67.98 72.39 73.73 57.08 49.65 55.64 56.56 62.40 62.65 39.58
IRL Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 13.03 16.95 17.06 32.69 46.75 30.32 17.31 22.97 26.32 24.87 26.93 32.59 43.22 35.69
IRL Stock market turnover ratio (%) 46.37 40.70 39.68 74.99 77.02 20.46 29.03 46.80 55.77 42.68 56.41 57.44 84.42 35.87
ITA Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 55.89 54.27 55.04 57.58 70.14 75.51 77.49 79.58 83.21 84.83 88.99 94.47 100.57 104.75
ITA Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 60.10 57.86 54.18 50.86 53.08 55.23 55.08 56.12 56.88 56.70 58.76 61.10 67.29 76.58
ITA Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 17.22 18.98 24.17 37.02 52.74 63.23 56.98 42.53 39.44 42.25 44.55 49.12 51.56 36.50
ITA Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 9.10 7.69 12.13 27.31 41.11 56.09 58.51 46.01 43.41 44.22 53.78 66.82 89.17 68.90
ITA Stock market turnover ratio (%) 44.59 42.57 68.42 104.96 84.19 111.51 86.23 103.60 111.03 109.71 140.13 148.49 210.92 79.43
NLD Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 93.23 99.22 104.59 114.97 125.36 134.20 135.30 141.16 147.99 157.83 165.04 167.19 188.06 193.16
NLD Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 78.23 78.99 78.31 41.03 49.19 92.15 95.07 97.49 101.69 105.51 111.48 117.63 121.99 129.89
NLD Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 81.24 86.22 103.17 132.41 155.37 161.85 136.87 102.15 90.94 88.95 89.45 102.11 116.18 82.53
NLD Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 52.96 69.09 75.12 87.09 107.53 141.83 212.67 179.94 101.68 109.88 125.14 143.72 192.59 179.32
NLD Stock market turnover ratio (%) 73.04 94.21 71.43 78.82 74.84 108.66 188.46 103.37 108.24 137.77 146.34 158.39 198.35 159.05
PRT Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 63.46 70.23 77.98 89.24 109.17 126.27 133.41 135.90 135.38 135.94 140.71 151.90 162.50 173.69
PRT Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 89.47 89.98 86.52 83.28 86.40 92.11 91.68 88.85 89.38 89.21 93.15 98.11 101.42 112.26
PRT Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 15.69 17.69 26.17 40.94 49.86 50.35 43.99 34.53 33.97 36.21 35.72 42.40 53.18 42.16
PRT Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 4.36 4.68 11.71 27.51 33.99 38.04 33.59 18.52 14.31 16.55 20.62 27.69 47.65 47.55
PRT Stock market turnover ratio (%) 23.16 33.34 69.15 94.58 64.72 92.06 51.54 44.52 39.48 56.11 60.76 82.09 117.23 77.73
ESP Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 72.28 73.19 78.25 85.15 89.59 97.77 101.18 105.71 113.17 124.86 145.65 166.98 187.89 202.84
ESP Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 72.63 71.59 68.23 67.98 75.30 84.73 86.77 86.70 86.68 90.17 100.51 116.85 131.94 149.62
ESP Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 30.69 35.25 43.58 57.11 66.09 75.51 79.04 69.88 72.42 83.17 84.01 92.64 111.96 90.76
ESP Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 10.64 24.77 58.24 95.01 114.39 140.05 148.30 138.13 121.75 106.32 121.35 141.65 174.72 177.08
ESP Stock market turnover ratio (%) 32.64 114.37 181.54 203.71 182.28 224.98 174.25 211.42 146.11 137.50 163.93 168.56 183.54 168.74
SWE Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 97.24 95.87 96.88 97.37 98.11 42.32 97.87 99.11 99.82 101.33 107.86 112.81 121.47 127.64
SWE Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 47.40 50.53 51.38 44.91 40.20 39.76 42.92 45.94 46.00 45.26 46.59 49.13 51.49 56.33
SWE Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 63.35 79.24 96.76 105.66 123.99 134.27 116.82 86.17 80.68 96.06 104.38 123.06 133.34 91.78
SWE Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 36.82 42.84 58.51 72.91 83.98 121.96 143.26 107.87 84.13 97.01 117.18 143.66 183.50 170.22
SWE Stock market turnover ratio (%) 57.99 62.49 71.92 75.68 74.24 117.48 113.55 101.05 103.90 118.58 119.94 137.88 157.10 143.82
GBR Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 111.77 115.67 116.44 115.97 118.37 129.47 134.63 139.22 143.53 151.16 158.54 170.15 186.35 211.43
GBR Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) 63.60 70.08 79.34 92.32 98.16 100.63 106.04 107.86 108.67 113.24 121.01 130.49 141.28 163.20
GBR Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) 113.72 127.13 139.46 149.86 174.01 179.59 157.33 127.78 121.09 126.65 128.02 139.51 140.76 103.40
GBR Stock market total value traded to GDP (%) 42.35 43.97 52.36 68.39 83.43 105.38 122.87 119.35 115.79 140.31 171.57 171.49 262.23 305.33
GBR Stock market turnover ratio (%) 38.32 37.00 43.46 53.29 52.66 69.25 80.58 93.31 98.42 133.24 141.78 123.96 259.59 236.83
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Table 6A. Standardized Financial Development Index by country, period 1995-2007 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration on data from the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
INDEXAUT -0.32 -0.35 -0.39 -0.37 -0.41 -0.42 -0.43 -0.45 -0.43 -0.38 -0.28 -0.20 -0.14 -0.35
INDEXBEL -0.50 -0.45 -0.41 -0.30 -0.26 -0.30 -0.31 -0.35 -0.36 -0.29 -0.20 -0.11 -0.02 -0.30
INDEXDEU -0.25 -0.16 -0.23 -0.17 -0.11 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.26 0.34 0.02
INDEXDNK -0.56 -0.53 -0.46 -0.37 -0.38 -0.06 -0.08 -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 0.06 0.15 0.27 -0.18
INDEXESP -0.47 -0.23 0.05 0.26 0.33 0.57 0.51 0.55 0.37 0.37 0.55 0.74 1.01 0.36
INDEXFIN -0.50 -0.48 -0.42 -0.31 0.02 0.40 0.38 0.23 0.11 0.13 0.27 0.42 0.63 0.07
INDEXFRA -0.33 -0.38 -0.31 -0.32 -0.23 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.20 0.35 -0.08
INDEXGBR -0.08 -0.02 0.08 0.21 0.33 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.69 0.85 0.89 1.55 0.50
INDEXGRE -0.67 -0.64 -0.53 -0.42 0.07 0.01 -0.25 -0.36 -0.38 -0.37 -0.28 -0.17 -0.08 -0.31
INDEXIRL -0.42 -0.41 -0.37 -0.19 -0.09 -0.24 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 -0.17 -0.06 0.04 0.19 -0.18
INDEXITA -0.55 -0.56 -0.49 -0.33 -0.26 -0.10 -0.16 -0.19 -0.18 -0.17 -0.05 0.04 0.28 -0.21
INDEXNLD -0.21 -0.19 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.04 -0.08 -0.15 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 0.07 0.35 -0.07
INDEXPRT -0.52 -0.48 -0.34 -0.18 -0.15 -0.02 -0.13 -0.22 -0.24 -0.19 -0.15 -0.02 0.18 -0.19
INDEXSWE -0.25 -0.18 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.33 0.13 0.04 0.16 0.26 0.45 0.67 0.14
